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BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF
PATENT DAMAGES
William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed†
Patent law is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, based
upon a story of patent infringement in which technology users
are presumed to be able to discover relevant patents in ad-
vance and either design around them or negotiate patent li-
censes before using the patented technology.  That story does
not hold true in many fields today, in which the number and
widespread ownership of potentially relevant patents renders
such preclearance both infeasible as a practical matter and
undesirable as a matter of economic policy.  But patent dam-
ages law continues to apply this outmoded paradigm.  As a
result, current doctrine perpetuates a vicious cycle of exces-
sive, socially harmful remedies.
We propose a number of ways for patent law to adapt to
this new reality.  First, reasonable royalty remedies should be
based on the market value of the patent before infringement
and should exclude post-infringement considerations such as
lock-in that infect current doctrine and lead to exaggerated
damages awards.  Second, patent remedy law should distin-
guish between infringers in the paradigmatic story, who can
be regarded as guilty infringers, and innocent infringers for
whom preclearance was not practicable; and it should further
distinguish between patent holders that were willing to li-
cense their patents before infringement and those that had
decided to retain exclusive control over their patented inven-
tion.  In effect, there are four combinations: innocent/willing,
innocent/unwilling, guilty/willing, and guilty/unwilling.
Remedies should depend on which combination is at issue,
and injunctions should be available only for unwilling licen-
sors.  In the innocent/unwilling scenario, the patent holder
should be able to obtain an injunction only if it agrees to bear
the innocent infringer’s costs of switching to a noninfringing
alternative.
† Lee is a partner in the Boston office of WilmerHale LLP.  Melamed is Profes-
sor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School.  The authors would like to
express their gratitude to Kevin Goldman, Stephanie Lin, Proshanto Mukherji,
Louis Tompros, and Allison Trzop for their contributions, without which this
Article would not have been possible, and to Dan Burk, Jorge Contreras, Mark
Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, and William Rooklidge for valuable comments
on an earlier draft. © William F. Lee and A. Douglas Melamed.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law is intended to foster the creation and distribu-
tion of new and valuable inventions.  To further that objective,
patent remedies must balance three competing incentives:
first, patentees’ incentive to invent; second, other firms’ incen-
tive to develop new products and to innovate, sometimes build-
ing upon the inventions of others; and third, the incentive for
patent holders and firms interested in using technology
claimed by their patents (“technology users”) to negotiate pat-
ent licenses “ex ante” (i.e., prior to any patent infringement)
where it is economically efficient for them to do so.  Undercom-
pensating patent holders gives them inadequate incentives to
invent, while overcompensating patent holders unnecessarily
deters innovation by other firms.
Current patent remedies do not adequately reflect these
competing incentives in light of current market circumstances
and thus, unsurprisingly, produce suboptimal results.  Patent
damages law is implicitly based upon a “paradigmatic story” of
patent infringement in which technology users are presumed to
be able to discover relevant patents in advance and then either
negotiate a patent license ex ante or choose a noninfringing
alternative.  In this story, infringers are wrongdoers: infringe-
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ment occurs only when the infringer either fails to discover
relevant patents or misappropriates the ideas in patents they
do find.
However, in many fields today—including key high-tech
fields like information technology (IT)—this paradigmatic story
does not apply.  A profusion of overlapping and unclear patent
rights in these fields make full patent preclearance—i.e., avoid-
ing infringement by obtaining in advance licenses to all rele-
vant patents—literally impossible in many situations and, in
others, so costly that it is not feasible as a practical matter.
The law has failed to adapt to this new reality.  Flaws in current
doctrine create a reinforcing cycle that perpetuates inflated
patent damages and imposes a wasteful drag on commercial
development and innovation, and an inefficient tax (in the form
of higher prices) on the public.
FIGURE 1
P
h
a
se
 I
II Ph
a
se II
Ex Post Considerations
In Hypothetical Negotiation
Increased
(Overcompensatory)
Litigation Damages
Increased
License Rates
Phase I
As seen in the figure above, this cycle has three phases:
• Phase One: Flawed reasonable royalty doctrine creates
litigation damages that overcompensate patent holders
by taking into account ex post considerations—i.e., de-
velopments after the infringement began, such as the
infringer’s costs of switching to a different technology—
that are not tied to the actual benefit conferred by the
patented technology.
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• Phase Two: Higher litigation damages result in higher
negotiated license fees because license negotiations
generally occur in the shadow of litigation.  The more a
patent holder can obtain from litigation, the more an
infringer has to pay the patent holder to forego
litigation.
• Phase Three: Higher license fees feed back into litiga-
tion damages.  Fees in negotiated licenses are a key fac-
tor in computing reasonable royalty damages.  Thus,
when those fees are inflated, the vicious cycle is perpet-
uated further.
The feedback loop is especially powerful in sectors such as
IT, where patent preclearance is particularly difficult because
of patent thickets and related economic factors.  As a result,
technology users often are not able to address specific in-
stances of patent infringement until after their products have
been developed and launched and they are already commit-
ted—“locked in”—to using the infringing technology.  This lock-
in increases the fees a patent holder can obtain in negotiation
from technology users and the damages the patent holder can
obtain in litigation.  Those two effects reinforce one another.
We propose a number of ways to break this vicious cycle.
First, reasonable royalty patent damages should be based on
the ex ante value of the patent and should exclude any ex post
considerations such as lock-in costs.  Second, damages law
should be structured to incentivize economically efficient
choices.  When it is impractical to identify every potentially
relevant patent and to negotiate a license ex ante, infringers
should not be penalized (by consideration of ex post evidence)
for proceeding with product development.  By contrast, when a
company can cost-effectively learn of relevant patents and
avoid infringement ex ante, it should be deterred from proceed-
ing to infringe the patents.  As we will explain, such deterrence
can be achieved better through enhanced damages than
through the injection of ex post considerations into the damage
calculation.
Our recommendations are summarized in the following ta-
ble, which uses nomenclature that is explained below:
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TABLE 1
Remedies for Patent Infringement
Ex ante willing licensor Ex ante unwilling licensor
Past damages:  Reasonable Past damages:  Lost profits
royalty based on strictly ex will usually be available.
ante hypothetical Otherwise, a reasonable
negotiation. royalty based on strictly ex
ante hypothetical
negotiation.
“Innocent” Prospective Relief: Prospective Relief:  Patent
Infringer Ongoing royalty at same holder chooses between:
rate as past damages.  No (1) ongoing royalty at same
injunction. rate as past damages (“Rule
Two”); or
(2) injunction, but patent
holder has to pay infringer’s
cost to switch to a
noninfringing alternative
(“Rule Four”).
Past damages: Past damages:
Compensatory:  Lost profits Compensatory:  Lost profits
if proven; otherwise will usually be available;
reasonable royalty based on otherwise, a reasonable
strictly ex ante hypothetical royalty based on strictly ex
negotiation; plus ante hypothetical
Deterrence:  Enhanced negotiation; plus
“Guilty” damages evaluated as of Deterrence:  Enhanced
Infringer lock-in date. damages evaluated as of
lock-in date.
Prospective Relief: Prospective Relief:
Ongoing royalty at same Injunction unless against
rate as past compensatory public interest or changed
damages.  No injunction. circumstances make it
inadvisable.
If no injunction, ongoing
royalty at same rate as past
compensatory damages.
I
BACKGROUND—HOW DAMAGES LAW GOT TO WHERE IT IS
Patent law is built on a fundamental principle that provid-
ing inventors with certain exclusive rights to their inventions
will incentivize the creation and dissemination of valuable in-
novations.1  As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “the
1 The instrumental purpose of patent law is stated explicitly in the U.S.
Constitution, which empowers Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
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limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was
never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the bene-
fit to the public or community at large was another and doubt-
less the primary object in granting and securing that
monopoly.”2
There is little dispute that providing inadequate patent pro-
tection to inventors would leave them without optimal incen-
tives to invent.3  There is also little dispute that the ultimate
goal of fostering innovation would be undermined by providing
too great a degree of protection to patents and, in particular,
that excessive damages for patent infringement would reduce
the overall incentive for firms to develop commercial products
and to innovate by building on earlier inventions.4
The assessment of damages for patent infringement is
therefore of central importance to Congress’s overall scheme to
foster innovation.  To that end, the Patent Act states: “A paten-
tee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent.”5  That remedy could be the grant of an injunction “in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation
of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; cf.
ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 42 (2005) (“[T]he standard justification for
patents and copyrights is that they provide a necessary incentive to create, dis-
seminate, and commercialize inventions and works of authorship.”).
2 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327–28 (1858); see also Quanta Comput.,
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 626 (2008) (noting that “the primary purpose
of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents
but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts’” (quoting Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917))).
3 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 40 (2011) (“[A] patent enables [the owner] to
capture returns from R&D investment by preventing others from appropriating
the invention and driving down prices through infringing competition.”); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 13 (2003) (“[A] firm is less likely to expend resources on developing a new
product if competing firms that have not borne the expense of development can
duplicate the product and produce it at the same marginal cost as the innovator;
competition will drive price down to marginal cost and the sunk costs of invention
will not be recouped.”).
4 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages
and Attorney’s Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 313–14
(2004) (“[S]upracompensatory awards could. . . . induce firms to . . . avoid market-
ing innovative products, or (in the antitrust context) from agreeing to unconven-
tional, but socially desirable, methods for joint production and distribution of
goods.” (footnotes omitted)); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (excessive royalties “act as a
tax on new products incorporating the patented technology, thereby impeding
rather than promoting innovation”).
5 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
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deems reasonable,”6 or “damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty
for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”7  Where
willful infringement is found, courts have the discretion to
award enhanced damages, up to three times the compensatory
damages award.8
There is a virtual consensus among scholars that the opti-
mum reasonable royalty remedy—in light of both incentives
needed to invent and those needed to develop commercial prod-
ucts and to innovate further upon earlier inventions—is one
that most closely restores the parties to the position they would
have been in had they been able to negotiate a patent license
before infringement (i.e., ex ante).9  At that time, the would-be
licensee would have been willing to pay for a license no more
than the incremental value of the patent over the next-best
alternative, in light of the intended uses of the patented tech-
nology and the anticipated profits therefrom.  The next-best
alternative might be a noninfringing technology with compara-
ble functionality or a very different alternative.  If the patent
holder had insisted on more than that amount, the would-be
licensee would have walked away from the deal.10  We refer to
the amount that the patent holder and the would-be licensee
would have agreed upon ex ante as the patent’s “market value.”
A reasonable royalty remedy equal to the market value of
the patent would best serve the patent laws’ purposes.  It would
6 Id. § 283.
7 Id. § 284.
8 Id.
9 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3 , at 186; John C. Jarosz & Michael J. R
Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The
Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 813 & n.204 (2013) (collecting
authorities); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2143 (2013). But see Ted Sichelman, Purging
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 522–25 (2014) (argu-
ing that status quo ante remedies may underincentivize certain socially valuable
inventions, such as drugs for rare diseases, and may overincentivize marginally
valuable inventions, such as minor components of complex products).
10 The difference in value between the patented technology and the next-best
alternative is the maximum amount on which the parties would have agreed.  In
many circumstances, depending on the relative bargaining power of the parties,
the agreed-upon royalty would be less than that.  If, for example, the would-be
licensee has an alternative to the patented technology that is worth $50 less and
the patent holder has no way to replace that licensee’s royalties, both the would-
be licensee and the patent holder stand to lose up to $50 if they fail to reach an
agreement and the would-be licensee chooses the noninfringing alternative.  In
that event, the parties would be likely to agree to split the gains from trade, and
thus on a royalty of less than $50, even assuming that there is no uncertainty
about validity or infringement.
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be equal to the amount to which the patent holder would have
agreed if the parties had been able to reach the idealized ex
ante preclearance agreement; requiring the patent holder to
pay more than that would require it to pay more than the value
of the patented technology and would indirectly impose costs
on third parties by taxing and thus reducing exploitation of the
patent and innovation built upon it; and paying the patent
holder more than the market value of the patent would create
perverse incentives for patenting inventions that cost users
more than they are worth.
The principle that patent damages should be based on the
amount that would have been agreed to in ex ante bargaining is
deeply embedded in patent law and is manifest in requirements
that, in most cases, courts should attempt either to compen-
sate the patent holder for the profits it lost as a result of the
infringement or to assess the “reasonable royalty” that the par-
ties would have agreed to in a “hypothetical negotiation” for a
patent license prior to infringement.11  Notably, if the parties
would have reached a license agreement before the infringe-
ment began, the patent holder’s lost profits would be equal to
the reasonable royalty to which it would have agreed.12
It turns out, however, that many of the doctrines that have
developed to implement these principles, often in cases similar
to the “paradigmatic story” in which the infringer could have
sought a license ex ante but did not do so, undermine the
purposes of patent law when they are applied in the increas-
ingly common case in which obtaining a license before infringe-
ment is not feasible.13  In particular, much of the current
“reasonable royalty” doctrine allows for consideration of factors
that arose only after the infringement began (i.e., ex post) and
that have little or nothing to do with the kind of agreement the
parties would have reached had they been able to negotiate a
license ex ante.14
A. Remedies for Past Infringement
Where a party is found to have infringed a patent through
past acts, compensation focuses on putting the patent holder
11 See infra subpart III.A.
12 While the Federal Circuit has held that the hypothetical ex ante negotiation
is not the exclusive method of assessing a reasonable royalty, it is by far the most
prevalent. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (noting that the hypothetical negotiation approach is not the sole
method for estimating a reasonable royalty, merely a “common” one).
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
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in the position it would have been in had its patent rights not
been infringed.15
1. Lost Profits/Actual Damages
If a patent holder can show that it lost a quantifiable
amount of profit as a result of the infringement, its damages
can be computed in a relatively straightforward manner.  These
lost profits—that is, how much more the patent holder would
have made if there had been no infringement—will generally be
the measure of “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement.”16
But there is a high bar for proving lost profits: “To obtain as
damages the profits on sales he would have made absent the
infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent
owner must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) ab-
sence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufac-
turing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and
(4) the amount of the profit he would have made.”17  If even one
of these elements is not established, lost profits are not
available.18
In practice, these factors are rarely satisfied unless the
patent owner and infringer actively compete in the same mar-
ket.19  Thus, lost profits are not available in a majority of
cases.20
15 See Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d
872, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The primary purpose of compensatory damages is to
return the patent owner to the financial position he would have occupied but for
the infringement.”).
16 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
17 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978); see also State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (adopting Panduit test).
18 If these factors are satisfied, then a wide variety of losses may count as lost
profits, such as losses attributable to lost sales, lowered prices, and/or lost collat-
eral sales.  7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (2014).
19 See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1578 (“In the two-supplier market, it is
reasonable to assume, provided the patent owner has the manufacturing and
marketing capabilities, that it would have made the infringer’s sales.  In these
instances, the Panduit test is usually straightforward and dispositive.” (citation
omitted)); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2017 (“Lost profits are difficult to R
prove, and any patent owner who does not sell goods in competition with the
defendant will be unable to demonstrate lost profits from infringement.” (footnote
omitted)).
20 See 2014 Patent Litigation Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 9, 10 chart 5
(July 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/as
sets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf [http://perma.cc/NJG5-M7BV] (finding
that from 2010 to 2013, courts awarded lost profits in 37% of patent infringement
cases).
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If the patent holder has a practice of licensing its invention,
the measure of actual damages is the royalty for which it would
have licensed the patent to the infringer, i.e., the established
royalty rate.21  It must, however, be a uniform rate freely nego-
tiated and paid by a sufficient number of licensees; infrequent
agreements and licenses negotiated in settlement of threatened
or actual litigation are generally insufficient to show an estab-
lished royalty.22  This high standard is rarely met in practice.23
2. “Reasonable Royalty” Damages
When actual damages cannot be determined, the Patent
Act instructs courts to award “in no event less than a reasona-
ble royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”24
The purpose of this “reasonable royalty,” as the Sixth Circuit
explained in the seminal case of U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff,
is to ensure that a patent holder “is not compelled to go away
with nominal damages just because he cannot show that his
property, or other like it, was commonly bought and sold on the
market.”25
Current thinking about reasonable royalty damages often
begins with the Southern District of New York’s 1970 decision
in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.26  The
long-running case involved knowing infringement of a patent
that was essential to the infringer’s product and whose com-
mercial value had been established before the infringement.27
The patent holder had a policy of not licensing anyone in the
United States other than its suppliers.28  In the parlance we
21 See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 490 (1853)
(“Where an inventor finds it profitable to exercise his monopoly by selling licenses
to make or use his improvement, he has himself fixed the average of his actual
damage, when his invention has been used without his license.”).
22 See Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889); Hanson v. Alpine Valley
Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078–79 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  For example, if a patent
holder promised to limit the number of licensees or agreed to a certain number of
licenses at preferential rates (e.g., to early adopters), prior licenses may not
demonstrate an “established royalty.” See, e.g., Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Roche
Diagnostics GmbH, 272 F. Supp. 2d 90, 119 (D. Mass. 2002); Tights, Inc. v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 442 F. Supp. 159, 165 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
23 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (D.
Del. 1994) (“Because of these stringent criteria, few courts have actually found an
established royalty.”).
24 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
25 216 F. 610, 616 (6th Cir. 1914).
26 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
27 Id. at 1123, 1134.
28 Id. at 1123.
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develop in Part IV below, the case involved a “guilty” infringer
and an unwilling licensor.
In its opinion, the district court surveyed the case law and
set forth the now-famous list of fifteen factors that courts had
previously considered in determining a reasonable royalty:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of
the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established
royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents
comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-
exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of terri-
tory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may
be sold.
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program
to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to
use the invention or by granting licenses under special condi-
tions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and
licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same
territory in the same line of business; or whether they are
inventor and promotor.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting
sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of
the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his
non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or con-
voyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under
the patent; its commercial success; and its current
popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the
old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working
out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of
the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by
the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the
invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that
use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may
be customary in the particular business or in comparable
businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous
inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
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elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or sig-
nificant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at
the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably
and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement . . . .29
Although the hypothetical ex ante bargain was only one of
the listed factors (Factor 15), the court focused on it as the
guiding framework for its analysis, and treated the first four-
teen factors largely as elements to be considered in aid of as-
sessing the hypothetical negotiation.30
On appeal, the Second Circuit endorsed the use of the
hypothetical negotiation in general as well as the specific list of
enumerated factors.31  However, the Second Circuit lowered
the royalty set by the district court, finding error in the court’s
failure to recognize that a willing licensee would not agree to
pay more in royalties than its anticipated profits.32  In effect,
the court held that a reasonable royalty cannot exceed the
amount a willing licensee would have agreed to pay ex ante.
The Georgia-Pacific decisions did not have an immediate
impact on how courts assessed reasonable royalties, but they
rose in prominence after the creation of the Federal Circuit in
1982.  Initially, the Federal Circuit treated the Georgia-Pacific
factors as only one way to approach what was essentially a
totality-of-the-circumstances calculation.33  But over the next
two decades, the court began treating the Georgia-Pacific fac-
tors as the preferred way to compute a reasonable royalty.34
More recent Federal Circuit cases indicate a decline in the
primacy of the Georgia-Pacific factors.  In a 2010 decision, the
29 Id. at 1120.
30 See id. at 1121–43.
31 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d
295, 296–97 (2d Cir. 1971).
32 Id. at 299.
33 See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding that using an analytical approach rather than a hypothetical negotiation
is not error because the law “does not mandate how the district court must
compute that figure, only that the figure compensate for the infringement”).
34 Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., Inc., 341 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  The high-
water mark for the influence of the Georgia-Pacific factors appears to be Parental
Guide of Texas, Inc. v. Thomson, Inc., where the Federal Circuit ruled that the
disputed contract term “Litigation Royalt[ies]” meant reasonable royalties under
35 U.S.C. § 284, and that these in turn were to be determined by using the
Georgia-Pacific factors.  446 F.3d 1265, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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court reaffirmed the hypothetical ex ante negotiation bench-
mark but criticized the Georgia-Pacific court’s list of evidentiary
factors for calculating the royalty as “unprioritized and often
overlapping.”35  The court emphasized that a reasonable roy-
alty should be based on the value of the “claimed invention,”
not on the value of the “platform” of which it is a part.36
In a 2012 decision, the court reaffirmed that the Georgia-
Pacific approach is not the exclusive means for calculating rea-
sonable royalties.37  And in 2014, the court held that any
method for determining a reasonable royalty must be tailored
to the relevant facts of the case.38
Today, reasonable royalty awards are the norm, not the
exception.  Between 2010 and 2013, for instance, courts
awarded reasonable royalties more than twice as often as lost
profits.39  This is not surprising, given the exacting legal stan-
dards for proving lost profits or an established royalty.40  Also,
an increasing number of suits are brought by nonpracticing
entities that cannot claim lost profits because they do not make
or sell any products or services.41
B. Remedies for Future Infringement
Patent holders whose patents have been infringed may
seek, in addition to damages for past infringement, injunctions
against future infringement or an award of ongoing royalties.42
35 ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
36 Id. (quoting Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
37 Energy Transp. Grp., Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F.3d 1342,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Once again, this court does not endorse Georgia-Pacific as
setting forth a test for royalty calculations, but only as a list of admissible factors
informing a reliable economic analysis.”).
38 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230–31 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(finding reversible error where the district court instructed the jury on Georgia-
Pacific factors not applicable to the case at hand).
39 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 20, at 10 chart 5.  Reasonable royal- R
ties were awarded in 81% of the cases. Id.  Lost profits were awarded in 37% of
cases and price erosion in 1% of cases. Id.  Because these data include cases in
which the award included a combination of reasonable royalties and other dam-
ages, the total exceeds 100%. Id. at 9 n.3.
40 See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
41 Litigations Over Time, PATENTFREEDOM (2014), https://www.patentfreedom.
com/about-npes/litigations/ [https://perma.cc/5M2K-M9SS].
42 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293,
1313–16 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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1. Injunctions
In the modern era of patent litigation, permanent injunc-
tions against adjudged infringers came to be “the norm.”43  In
2006, however, the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. rejected the practice that injunctions
“automatically follow[ ]” infringement determinations.44  The
Court held that “well-established principles of equity” should
control and that “a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must satisfy a four-factor test,” namely that:
1. it has suffered an irreparable injury;
2. remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
3. considering the balance of hardships between the plain-
tiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
4. the public interest would not be disserved by a perma-
nent injunction.45
Although the Supreme Court offered little in the way of
practical guidance as to how courts should apply the enumer-
ated factors, recent empirical analyses indicate that courts are
now far less likely to award injunctions, particularly when the
patent holder is a nonpracticing entity.46
2. Ongoing Royalties
Following eBay, courts have increasingly awarded ongoing
royalties in lieu of a permanent injunction.  This type of pro-
spective relief had previously been relatively rare, and courts
initially appeared to assume that postverdict royalties would be
assessed in the same manner as royalties for past infringe-
43 KSM Fastening Sys. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir.
1985); see also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has
been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.”).
44 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006).
45 Id. at 391.
46 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and
the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 fig.1 (2012) (following eBay in award-
ing injunctions to 79% of practicing entities and 26% of nonpracticing entities).
Relatedly, courts are often reluctant to enjoin the sale of an entire product when
only a component of the product infringes.  See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding no abuse of discre-
tion in the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to in-
fringement of a patent on one feature of a multicomponent product); cf. Apple, Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2014-1802, 2015 WL 9014387, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
16, 2015) (finding abuse of discretion in district court’s denial of a permanent
injunction that was limited to enjoining defendant’s use of infringing features).
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ment.47  In 2007 and 2008, however, the Federal Circuit de-
cided a pair of cases holding that postverdict royalties may be
based on facts different from those used by juries when deter-
mining royalties for preverdict infringement.
First, in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed a postverdict royalty as an alternative to awarding
the plaintiff a permanent injunction but vacated the amount of
the ongoing royalty.48  The court held that the district court
could not simply extend the jury’s preverdict royalty rate with-
out giving “any indication as to why that rate is appropriate.”49
Paice offered no explanation on two critical points: (1) why or
under what circumstances the ongoing royalty rate should dif-
fer from the “reasonable royalty” awarded for preverdict in-
fringement and (2) how district courts should determine the
appropriate postverdict rate.50
The Federal Circuit addressed these issues a few months
later in Amado v. Microsoft Corp.51  On the first question, the
court held that there is a “fundamental difference . . . between a
reasonable royalty for pre-verdict infringement and damages
for post-verdict infringement” because “[p]rior to judgment, lia-
bility for infringement, as well as the validity of the patent, is
uncertain, and damages are determined in the context of that
uncertainty.”52  Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded, the
jury’s reasonable royalty award should “logically” provide a
floor for postverdict ongoing royalty rates.53
On the second question, the Amado court instructed that,
at least in that case, the district court should consider the
following factors:
47 See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442 (E.D.
Tex. 2006) (holding that postverdict royalties should be “based on the same rea-
sonable royalty calculation used by the jury”); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-
1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) (denying a motion to
sever the action to determine postverdict royalties because “there would be no
issues for decision except simple mathematical calculations based on defendant’s
sales”), aff’d, 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
48 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
49 Id.
50 In a concurrence, Judge Rader stated that “pre-suit and post-judgment
acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the
change in the parties’ legal relationship and other factors.” Id. at 1317 (Rader, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).  He did not elaborate on what that meant.
51 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52 Id. at 1361–62.
53 Id. at 1362 n.2.  As discussed infra subpart III.D, the court’s analysis is
flawed because reasonable royalty awards for past infringement are determined
on the assumption that the patent is valid and infringed. See, e.g., Lucent Techs.,
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The hypothetical
negotiation . . . assumes that the asserted patent claims are valid and infringed.”).
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the parties’ bargaining positions, and the resulting change in
economic circumstances, resulting from the determination of
liability—for example, the infringer’s likelihood of success on
appeal, the infringer’s ability to immediately comply with the
injunction, the parties’ reasonable expectations if the stay
was entered by consent or stipulation, etc.—as well as the
evidence and arguments found material to the granting of the
injunction and the stay.54
Following Amado, courts have looked to these factors for gui-
dance but have not applied a consistent methodology in setting
ongoing royalty rates.55  What is clear, however, is that Amado
approved the consideration of ex post developments.
C. Enhanced Damages and Willfulness
In addition to compensatory damages, the Patent Act al-
lows for enhanced damages “up to three times the amount
found or assessed.”56  Although the statute does not provide a
standard for determining when enhanced damages are appro-
priate, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the law to permit
enhanced damages only on a finding of “willful infringement or
bad faith.”57
For many years, the Federal Circuit appeared to use a neg-
ligence standard for assessing willfulness.  In 1983, in Under-
water Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., the court held that
one with “actual notice of another’s patent rights” had “an af-
firmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not
he is infringing,” including “the duty to seek and obtain compe-
tent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possi-
ble infringing activity.”58
In 2007, however, the Federal Circuit overruled Underwa-
ter Devices in an en banc decision.  In In re Seagate Technology,
LLC, the Federal Circuit recognized that Underwater Devices’s
54 517 F.3d at 1362.
55 Compare, e.g., Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d, 620,
623–24 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (calculating ongoing royalty using Georgia-Pacific fac-
tors), with Creative Internet Advert. Corp. v. Yahoo!, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847,
861 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (basing royalty on increase over jury-determined rate), and
Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 02-00790 SI, 2009 WL 975424, at
*5–7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (reapplying Georgia-Pacific factors with different
weights to calculate ongoing royalty).
56 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
57 Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d
1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964) (holding that a patent holder “could in a case of
willful or bad-faith infringement recover punitive or ‘increased’ damages under
the statute’s trebling provision”).
58 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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negligence-like standard set a lower bar for willfulness in pat-
ent law than other areas of law.59  The court adopted an objec-
tive recklessness standard for willfulness and abandoned
potential infringers’ affirmative duty of due care, including the
obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.60
The Federal Circuit in Seagate set forth a two-part test for
willfulness.  First, “to establish willful infringement, a patentee
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions con-
stituted infringement of a valid patent.”61  If the threshold ob-
jective standard is satisfied, the patent holder then must
demonstrate that the accused infringer either knew about this
objectively defined risk or should have known because it was so
obvious.62
However, “a finding of willfulness does not require an
award of enhanced damages; it merely permits it.”63  Courts
use several factors to determine whether to enhance damages:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or de-
sign of another;
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent
protection, investigated the . . . patent and formed a good-
faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; [ ]
(3) the infringer’s behavior . . . [in] the litigation;
(4) [the infringer’s] size and financial condition;
(5) [c]loseness of the case;
(6) [d]uration of [the infringer’s] misconduct;
(7) [r]emedial action by the [infringer];
(8) [infringer’s] motivation for harm; [and]
(9) [w]hether [the infringer] attempted to conceal its
misconduct.64
59 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“The term willful is not unique to patent law, and it has a well-established mean-
ing in the civil context.”).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1371.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1368.
64 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (footnotes
and citations omitted).  Although Read predated Seagate, “Seagate did not change
the application of the Read factors with respect to enhancement of damages when
willful infringement under [35 U.S.C.] § 285 is found.”  Spectralytics, Inc. v.
Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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D. Where Damages Law Is Today
As discussed above, Georgia-Pacific concerned an infringer
that could have sought a license ex ante but did not do so.65
Patent damages law appears to implicitly assume that such ex
ante bargaining is feasible.  The benchmark of the hypothetical
ex ante bargain—what would have happened if the infringer
had sought and obtained a license ex ante—is a natural way to
frame the inquiry in that situation; and it thus understandably
became the touchstone for patent damages law.
The courts lost sight, however, of that temporal focus, and
have allowed ex post considerations to factor into the hypothet-
ical ex ante negotiation.66  If the parties would not have known
about those ex post matters at the time of the ex ante bargain,
introducing them into the analysis could lead to an erroneous
determination of the royalty that the parties would have agreed
to in that bargain.  As explained in Part III below, that situation
has become commonplace in recent years, as courts have used
the evidentiary factors suggested in the earlier and very differ-
ent cases in ways that have systematically led to inflated dam-
age awards.  The courts appear often not to have been mindful
of this consequence and, even if mindful, might have thought it
appropriate in the implicitly assumed paradigmatic case in
which the infringer acted wrongfully.
II
THE PARADIGMATIC INFRINGEMENT STORY AND THE “DEVELOP
WITHOUT FULL PRECLEARANCE” DYNAMIC
A. The Paradigmatic Infringement Story
Patent infringement is a strict liability offense, and patent
damages law is based on an implicit, paradigmatic “story” in
which the infringer is a bad actor.67  In this story, the inventor
conceives of an invention and either practices it personally or
licenses others to do so.  Others in the field are able to learn of
the patent and either design around it or negotiate with the
patent holder for a license.  Under this view, ex ante licensing is
both feasible and desirable.  Infringement can occur only if the
65 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1123
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
66 See, e.g., id. at 1118.
67 See Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement,
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1590 (2011) (discussing the strict liability nature of direct
patent infringement). But see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory
of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV.  (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that direct patent infringe-
ment should be viewed as an intentional tort).
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infringer behaves badly, either by misappropriating the ideas in
a patent it knows about or by failing to search diligently for the
patent in the first place.  Inflation of reasonable royalty dam-
ages through the use of ex post considerations might seem
unobjectionable or even desirable in this context, in which fail-
ing to obtain preclearance is implicitly regarded as wrongful.
This paradigmatic story—and patent law generally—takes
no account of the information costs of finding and evaluating
potentially relevant patents, nor of the negotiation costs in-
volved in obtaining licenses.  The patent system places the
practical burden of avoiding infringement on potential infring-
ers, and the damages calculus focuses on the patent holder.
Hardship to the infringer is rarely taken into account and is not
included among the Georgia-Pacific factors.68
Historically, when patents were fewer and industries more
compact, the infringer’s information and negotiation costs may
have been small enough that the paradigmatic story remained
broadly true.  And such patent preclearance still does occur
today, in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
where the potentially relevant patents are both reasonably as-
certainable during the product development timeframe and rel-
atively small in number.69  Patent preclearance can and does
occur among known competitors in other sectors as well, as
firms are often well situated to monitor the patent estates and
commercial developments of market participants; in this con-
text, however, ex ante agreements often take the form of broad
cross-licenses rather than product-specific licenses based on
individually identified patents.70  But the paradigmatic story
no longer applies to much of the modern commercial
landscape.
B. The “Develop Without Full Preclearance” Dynamic
Traditional conceptions regarding the feasibility and desir-
ability of patent preclearance are often inapplicable to present-
day circumstances.  The explosion in the number of issued
patents has created a different dynamic in many industries,
especially in high-tech fields like IT.  In these sectors, products
have grown far more complex, and the number of potentially
68 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
69 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 81 (noting a consensus that “patent R
clearance [is] ‘mandatory’ in those sectors”).
70 See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 122–24 (2000)
(describing the use of cross-licenses in industries that have patent thickets).
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relevant patents has increased exponentially.71  Several factors
often combine to make wholesale preclearance infeasible: high
search costs, high negotiation costs, and high costs of delay.
High Search Costs—The primary reason that firms in sec-
tors such as IT cannot preclear patents is that the cost of
searching for and identifying all potentially infringed patents is
prohibitive.72  Part of this is the sheer number of patents that
read on any given device in these fields.  An average
smartphone, for example, has been estimated to use over
250,000 different patented technologies held by many different
owners.73  A microprocessor may itself use thousands of pat-
ented technologies.74  Many of these patents are of dubious
validity.75  The literature describes this virtually impenetrable
set of overlapping potential patent rights as a “patent
thicket.”76  Firms cannot realistically hack through this
thicket—that is, identify and evaluate all the possibly relevant
patents—before starting to develop a new product.77
Moreover, in the United States, even the most comprehen-
sive search would not identify all of the relevant patents in the
field.  U.S. patent applications are typically not published until
at least eighteen months after they are filed.78  And the pub-
lished applications are not definitive because the claims may
change significantly during prosecution.79  Thus, for any given
product, there may be thousands of relevant nonpublic appli-
cations that literally cannot be identified before the product is
developed and launched.
71 See, e.g., RPX Corp., Amendment No. 4 (Form S-1/A), 59 (Apr. 29, 2011)
(“Based on our research, we believe there are more than 250,000 active patents
relevant to today’s smartphones, a significant increase compared to our estimate
of approximately 70,000 patents that were active and relevant to mobile phones in
2000.”).
72 See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1, 31–32 (2013) (arguing that due to high search costs for technology users, it
may be appropriate under certain circumstances to impose a duty on patentees to
attempt to identify and negotiate licenses with potential infringers prior to their
taking any infringing actions); Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the
Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 307 (2012) (discussing the prob-
lem of high patent search costs).
73 RPX Corp., Amendment No. 4 (Form S-1), 59 (Apr. 29, 2011).
74 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2009. R
75 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1496–1500 (2001) (discussing the Patent and Trademark Office’s low stan-
dard for approving patents).
76 Shapiro, supra note 70, at 119. R
77 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2148. R
78 See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1967).
79 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 87–89. R
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Another source of high search costs is uncertainty as to
what the claims mean.  Many patents that might be identified
as potentially relevant will turn out not to be infringed.  For
example, courts consider IT to be a “predictable” art,80 meaning
that one skilled in the art needs less specific guidance or direc-
tion from the patent.81  As a result, claims can be fairly impre-
cise and still not indefinite,82 and they can stray quite far from
what the specification discloses and still satisfy the enable-
ment83 and written description requirements.84  Moreover,
structure and function intertwine closely in this area.
Software, for example, can often be described as easily by what
it does as by what it is.85  All of this results in broad claims
whose meaning remains vague until a court construes them.86
Thus, even if a firm could identify a set of potentially relevant
patents, it would still be an expensive and uncertain undertak-
ing to determine which ones genuinely cover a particular
product.87
80 Troxler Elec. Labs., Inc. v. Pine Instrument Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 574, 604
(E.D.N.C. 2009) (explaining that “electrical devices” are “well known and predict-
able technologies” (citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
81 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE AND PATENT OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCE-
DURE § 2164.03 (“The amount of guidance or direction needed to enable the inven-
tion is inversely related to the amount of knowledge in the state of the art as well
as the predictability in the art. . . . [T]he more predictable the art is, the less
information needs to be explicitly stated in the specification.” (citation omitted)).
82 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014)
(holding that indefiniteness depends upon whether one skilled in the art could
understand a claim term).
83 Lift-U v. Ricon Corp., No. 10–CV–01850–LHK, 2011 WL 5118634, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (“[In] a predictable art[,] . . . inventions may be enabled
with relative ease.”).
84 See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc).
85 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 10, 84–85 (describing problems with R
“functional claiming”); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2173–74. R
86 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 80–86.  The Supreme Court recently R
held that claims directed to an abstract idea are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 even if they also recite the use of a generic computer to implement the
abstract idea.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357–59
(2014).  It is still too early to gauge the effect this will have on overbroad IT claims
and what fraction of them it will render invalid.
87 Numerous scholars have proposed revisions to claim construction method-
ology to increase clarity and predictability. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim
Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1033, 1060–65 (2007) (discussing the relative merits of reforms at the trial
court and appellate court levels); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges
Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 31–38 (2001) (recom-
mending expedited appeal of claim constructions); David L. Schwartz, Practice
Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent
Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 266–67 (2008) (proposing reforms of U.S. Patent
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Still another reason for high search costs is the nature of
modern devices.  In fields like IT, products tend to include a
large number of highly technical components, which are often
supplied by a variety of different manufacturers.88  The firm
that makes the overall product often does not know the precise
operation of all of the constituent components and thus cannot
realistically search for patents that cover them.89  But the firm
is nevertheless liable if any component—either alone or in con-
junction with other components of the larger product—in-
fringes a particular patent.90
Furthermore, nonpracticing entities (NPEs) or patent ag-
gregators hold an ever-increasing number of patents.91  While a
technology user might expect entities that make or sell certain
types of products to have relevant patents, it is especially diffi-
cult to identify in advance potentially relevant but never-com-
mercialized patents that are held by NPEs.
High Negotiation Costs—Even if a firm could identify all of
the patents that read on a planned product and further deter-
mine which of those patents are likely valid, it would still be
prohibitively expensive to negotiate licenses before developing
and selling the infringing products.  Modern devices may po-
tentially infringe many thousands of patents held by numerous
different owners,92 and a firm would have to negotiate a license
with each of them individually.93  That would rarely—if ever—
be feasible, in part because of the transaction costs that would
and Trademark Office rules and processes to reduce claim construction
uncertainty).
88 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 90–91. R
89 Id.
90 In many cases, component manufacturers agree to indemnify the firm that
makes the overall product, but these manufacturers are likewise constrained
from preclearance by the dynamics of the field.  Moreover, infringement often
involves multiple components such that the entire product could infringe even
though no individual component does, and even though no individual entity is
aware of how all of the relevant components operate.
91 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 8 n.5. R
92 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2010–11 n.40 (collecting evidence of R
royalty stacking in the IT industry).
93 Some commentators have argued that firms can navigate patent thickets
and the high negotiation costs that result from them via various forms of collective
action and cooperation such as patent pools, portfolio cross-licenses, and stan-
dard-setting activities. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust
Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1105 (2003) (dis-
cussing the use of cross-licenses and patent pools in the semiconductor and
biotech sectors).  Whatever the theoretical merit of this idea, it is clear that the
forms of collective action that exist today have not begun to solve the problem.
Even if such actions become more common in the future, there is no reason to
think that they will eliminate or significantly reduce the costs and problems
created when products read on tens of thousands of patents.
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be incurred to negotiate individually with all of the relevant
patent holders and in part because of the coordination problem
and the likelihood of holdup by some patent holders if they
know that the infringer needs to obtain a license from all of
them before developing its product.94
High Costs of Delay—A third factor is that many industries
(such as IT) place a premium on quick development and time to
market, and penalize delays harshly.95  The delay involved in
identifying and licensing relevant patents would make it impos-
sible for a technology user to bring a product to market in
anything close to a commercially reasonable time.96  The prod-
uct being developed would usually be obsolete before it could
obtain all the licenses.  If firms were required to obtain licenses
to all potentially infringed patents before developing and mar-
keting their products, the product development and innovation
processes would, as a practical matter, come to a halt.
* * * * *
In sum, firms in IT and similarly crowded, fast-moving sec-
tors simply cannot be expected to identify and license all rele-
vant patents before developing their products.  Some firms opt
out of these markets entirely.97  Those that remain are required
to develop their products without the benefit of full
preclearance.98  This does not mean that these firms are willful
or even knowing infringers.  To the contrary, “[s]imultaneous
invention and inadvertent infringement are . . . ubiquitous” in
94 Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19–20 (2008);
Shapiro, supra note 70, at 120. R
95 Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?,
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 976–77 (2005) (“[I]nvestors commonly referred to lead time or
first-mover advantages.  The premise is that a portfolio company that truly is the
first to provide a sophisticated and functional response to an important problem
can expect to earn a supranormal return for years to come.” (footnote omitted)).
96 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 91. R
97 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699
(1998) (noting that a “proliferation of patents on individual [gene] fragments” will
lead to the underuse of research materials and the inhibition of research); Josh
Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 465 (1995)
(explaining that the threat of litigation deters smaller firms from entering areas of
research where larger firms hold patents).
98 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 80 (observing that “IT R
firms . . . essentially ‘ignor[e] patents’” when developing their products (quoting
Brian Kahin, Senior Fellow, Comput. & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n, The Patent
Ecosystem in IT: Business Practice and Arbitrage, at the FTC Hearing on: The
Evolving IP Marketplace 61 (Dec. 5, 2008)).
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these sectors.99  But the net result is an efficient and socially
desirable “develop without full preclearance” dynamic in which
firms do not address potential infringement or negotiate li-
censes until after they are already committed to a particular
design or method.
C. Lock-In Costs
When licenses are negotiated ex post, rather than ex ante
(as the “paradigmatic story” assumes is possible), their value
acquires a critical temporal dimension.  For example, the value
of the patented technology relative to alternatives might have
increased or decreased for reasons that have little if anything to
do with the infringer, such as market developments that make
products using the patented technologies more or less in de-
mand and valuable.
More important, in the interval between the ex ante hypo-
thetical negotiation date and the ex post actual negotiation
date (or the date when litigation damages are assessed), the
infringer will usually have made substantial asset-specific in-
vestments tied to the infringing technology.  It will have incor-
porated the technology into its products, configured factories to
produce it, trained employees and customers in its use, and so
on.100  In sectors such as IT, which involve multicomponent
products, interoperating components (e.g., a modem and a
microprocessor) will often have been specially designed to work
with the infringing technology.101  Complementary or periph-
eral devices (e.g., a computer monitor or keyboard), too, will
often have been specially designed to work with an infringing
product and may themselves implement the infringing technol-
ogy solely in order to be compatible.102
These direct and indirect investments in the infringing
technology often make it very difficult for the infringer to switch
to a different technology ex post.103  The infringing firm and/or
its suppliers and the producers of complements would have to
99 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2148.  Studies indicate that fewer R
than 2% of infringement cases in the IT industry involved copying.  Christopher A.
Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1456
tbl.3 (2009); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L.
REV. 709, 712–15 (2012) (discussing the frequency of simultaneous invention).
But see Sichelman, supra note 9, at 544 (suggesting that copying is more
common).
100 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2140. R
101 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2016. R
102 Id.
103 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 105–10 (1999)
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-2\CRN203.txt unknown Seq: 26 11-JAN-16 13:28
410 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:385
redesign products, retool factories, retrain employees, reedu-
cate customers, and eliminate infringing inventory.104  Compo-
nents and/or complementary products, even those that do not
themselves use the patented technology, may need to be re-
placed or modified to maintain compatibility.  Ex post, the in-
fringing firm would have to incur all of these costs in order to
switch to an alternative technology, whether for present prod-
ucts or for subsequent-generation products.  These are costs
the infringing firm would not have had to incur if it had used
the new technology ex ante, and they serve to “lock in” the firm
to the infringing technology.105
We use the term “lock-in costs” to refer to how much more
it would cost the infringer to switch to an alternative technology
ex post than it would have cost to switch ex ante.106  These
costs, which in effect reduce the value of the alternative, will
often be substantial because of the infringer’s investments in
the infringing technology.  A numerical example makes this
clear.
Suppose that the infringer can choose between the infring-
ing technology (A) and the best noninfringing alternative (B).
Suppose further that, ex ante, A would require an up-front cost
of $200 and generate operating profits of $1,000, for a net
value of $800, while B would require an up-front cost of only
$100 but would generate operating profits of only $850, for a
net value of $750.  The ex ante value to the infringer of A
relative to B is $50.  If B were an unpatented technology, the
infringer would pay ex ante no more than $50 for a license to A.
Now suppose the infringer (perhaps not knowing of the
patent) implements the infringing technology A and pays the
$200 up-front cost, none of which can be repurposed for tech-
nology B.  Ex post, holding everything else constant, the in-
fringer expects a full $1,000 payoff from using A.  B, by
contrast, still has an expected payoff of only $750.  Thus, the ex
post value to the infringer of A relative to B is $250.  The in-
fringer would pay ex post up to that amount to avoid having to
switch to B.  The infringer’s lock-in cost is $200—the difference
104 Id. at 111.
105 The third parties’ switching costs are properly regarded as part of the
infringer’s lock-in costs because the infringer will need to compensate those par-
ties in some manner to induce them to make the adjustments required to facilitate
its technology change.
106 These costs are also sometimes referred to as “switching costs.”  We use the
term lock-in costs to emphasize that we are addressing the costs that arise solely
from the commitment to the technology, and not those related to the incremental
advantage of the patented technology compared to alternatives.
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between the ex post value ($250) and the ex ante value ($50).
The infringer is willing to pay an additional $200 ex post, even
though the patented technology is unchanged and the patent
holder has done nothing to increase its value since the ex ante
period.107
The “develop without full preclearance” dynamic creates
substantial lock-in costs—often many times larger than the ex
ante value of the invention itself.108  This is particularly true
when the infringing feature is a small part of a larger device.109
In such cases, the entire product (or large parts of it, including
many noninfringing features) may need to be redesigned in
order to avoid using the infringing feature.110
III
CURRENT LAW SYSTEMATICALLY OVERCOMPENSATES
PATENT HOLDERS
Courts and scholars broadly agree that a reasonable roy-
alty should not exceed a patented invention’s economic bene-
fits over the available alternatives.111  An infringer would not
pay more than the value of those incremental benefits in an ex
ante bargain, so focusing on those benefits aligns the damages
awarded after infringement with the market value (if there had
been a market) of the patented technology before lock-in.  As-
suming the appropriateness of other aspects of patent law,
awarding reasonable royalty damages based upon the incre-
107 It is possible that the ex post up-front costs for B will be greater than the
$100 ex ante up-front costs.  For example, it might cost more to convert a produc-
tion line built for A to be suitable for B than it would have cost to build the
production line for B ex ante.  In that event, the net value of B ex post would be
less than $750, the infringer would be willing to pay more than $250 for a license
to A, and the lock-in cost would be greater than $200.
108 Cf. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2009 (explaining that “companies R
are paying holdup money to avoid the threat of infringement”).
109 See id. at 1996–98, 2009.
110 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 78; Lemley & Melamed, supra note R
9, at 2140; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2009. R
111 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Daralyn J.
Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royal-
ties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 627–39 (2010); Jarosz & Chapman, supra note
9, at 795; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1996; Christopher B. Seaman, R
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Dam-
ages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1711–12 (2010); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra
note 3, at 140–41 (endorsing this principle in an FTC Report based on input from R
over 140 participants, including business representatives from large and small
firms, startups, the independent inventor community, leading patent practition-
ers, economists, and patent law scholars, as well as over fifty written submis-
sions).  For a list of Federal Circuit cases citing this proposition, see CHISUM, supra
note 18, at § 20.07[2][e]. R
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mental benefit of the patented technology provides appropriate
incentives both for patent holders to innovate and for “inno-
cent”112 parties to develop and commercialize products despite
the risk that they may face liability for patent infringement.113
There is also broad agreement that a sound way of assess-
ing the market value of the patented technology is to imagine a
hypothetical ex ante negotiation between a willing licensee and
a willing licensor—provided that the hypothetical negotiation
framework is carefully and properly applied.114  For this, it is
critical that the hypothetical negotiation be based solely on ex
ante considerations.115  The use of ex post considerations al-
lows the patent holder to extract a premium—above the ex ante
value of the invention—based on factors like lock-in costs.116
Current law, however, allows ex post considerations to corrupt
the hypothetical negotiation in a variety of ways.117
112 Current law distinguishes between ordinary and willful infringement.  We
propose a different distinction, between “guilty” and “innocent” infringement, in-
fra Part IV.
113 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 160. R
114 Id. at 175.  Some scholars, however, have advocated the elimination of the
hypothetical negotiation construct in favor of alternative methods of valuing the
patented technology based on ex post evidence. See, e.g., Jarosz & Chapman,
supra note 9, at 811–12; David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value R
Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 126–27 (2014).
115 The hypothetical negotiation construct is premised on the parties’ mutual
understanding that the patent is valid and infringed. See infra Section III.D.1.
Thus, any ex post knowledge with respect to validity or infringement is irrelevant
to the hypothetical negotiation itself.
116 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2009. R
117 Separate from these concerns about ex post contamination, the Federal
Circuit has recently suggested that the concept of an infringing sale “within the
United States” for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) may encompass sales of prod-
ucts within the United States even though those products are not made in the
United States and never enter the United States. See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v.
Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 2014–1492, 2015 WL 4639309, at *21, *24 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 4, 2015) (remanding for a retrial regarding the location of sales of defendant’s
products and the significance of the defendant’s “design win” that resulted in an
extended worldwide sales cycle in which the defendant sold products incorporat-
ing the allegedly infringing technology).  The Federal Circuit did not resolve the
issue of how the location of a “sale” is to be determined, noting that “[t]he stan-
dards for determining where a sale may be said to occur do not pinpoint a single,
universally applicable fact that determines the answer, and it is not even settled
whether a sale can have more than one location.” Id. at *21.  To the extent this
issue is resolved in such a way that a patent holder can claim a royalty for wholly
extraterritorial activities, such an expansion of U.S. patent law would similarly
overcompensate patent holders and disincentivize follow-on innovation (for exam-
ple, by potentially exposing technology users to overlapping domestic and foreign
remedies for the same infringing activity).
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A. Current Reasonable Royalty Law Overcompensates
Patent Holders by Contaminating the Hypothetical
Negotiation with Ex Post Considerations
Reasonable royalty law, drawing on the paradigmatic story
of the infringer as the guilty party, was not developed with
significant consideration of potential harms to the infringer,
and did not focus on the ways in which ex post evidence could
distort the determination of the reasonable royalty.118  Ex post
valuations and lock-in costs have thus been allowed to contam-
inate the purportedly ex ante hypothetical negotiation in a vari-
ety of ways: the so-called “book of wisdom” doctrine, the way
the Georgia-Pacific factors are commonly used to determine
reasonable royalties, and the selection of the hypothetical ne-
gotiation date.119
1. Ex Post Contamination via the “Book of Wisdom”
Doctrine
Development of the Doctrine—The “book of wisdom” doc-
trine provides that a royalty rate may be determined based in
part upon events after the hypothetical negotiation date.120  It
originated in a 1933 Supreme Court decision, Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.121 Sinclair did not, how-
ever, concern the determination of a reasonable royalty for pur-
poses of assessing patent infringement damages.  Instead, the
task before the court was how to determine the appropriate
measure of damages for breach of a contract to assign a patent
in order to put the intended assignee in the same position as it
would have been in had there been no breach (i.e., if the patent
been assigned to it as promised).122  Justice Cardozo wrote in
that context that “[t]he [subsequent] use that has been made of
the patented device is a legitimate aid to the appraisal of the
value of the patent at the time of the breach.”123  Ex post expe-
rience is a “book of wisdom” that should be used to “bring out
and expose to light the elements of value that were [in the
118 See supra section I.A.2.
119 Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
120 See, e.g., Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co. 853 F.2d 1568, 1575–76
(Fed. Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme
Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (dis-
cussing the book of wisdom doctrine); see generally Jarosz & Chapman, supra
note 9, at 801–03 (discussing the application of the book of wisdom doctrine to R
permit consideration of ex post facts in setting a reasonable royalty).
121 289 U.S. 689 (1933).
122 Id. at 697–99.
123 Id. at 697.
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patent] from the beginning.”124  That reasoning is both sound
and uncontroversial—had there been no breach, the plaintiff
would have owned the patent ex post, and it was appropriate to
determine the patent’s worth at that time.
The Federal Circuit engrafted the book of wisdom doctrine
onto the reasonable royalty analysis in Fromson v. Western
Litho Plate & Supply Co.,125 which involved willful infringe-
ment.126 Citing Sinclair despite the very different problem it
addressed, the Federal Circuit held that even though the law
“speaks of negotiations as of the time infringement began,” it
still “permits and often requires a court to look to events and
facts that occurred thereafter.”127
The court said that even ex post facts that “could not have
been known to or predicted by the hypothesized negotiators”
may be considered,128 but it did not rely on such ex post evi-
dence either to set a royalty rate or in explaining why the dis-
trict court erred.  Instead, the court vacated the district court’s
reasonable royalty determination because it found that the
court had committed several errors, including failing to explain
why it disregarded “testimony and documents” showing that
the infringer predicted ex ante “high profits and prices.”129
Nevertheless, following Fromson, courts have regularly relied
on the book of wisdom doctrine to permit the consideration of
ex post developments, regardless whether those ex post devel-
opments provided any insight into the parties’ ex ante bargain-
ing positions or whether the case involved willful
infringement.130
124 Id. at 698.
125 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
126 Id. at 1572–73.
127 Id. at 1575.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1577.
130 See, e.g., Advanced Tech. Incubator, Inc. v. Sharp Corp., No. 2:07-CV-468,
2009 WL 4723733, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2009) (denying motion to exclude
expert testimony based on consideration of information that postdated the hypo-
thetical negotiation date); Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917
(E.D. Tex. 2008) (“The jury may consider the infringer’s actual sales and revenue
up to the date of trial as part of the ‘book of wisdom.’”); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v.
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462, 466 (D. Del. 2005) (con-
cluding that damages calculation could be based on “sales projections of the
accused product that did not exist at the time of the hypothetical negotiation”); St.
Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., No. Civ.A. 03–241 JJF,
2004 WL 2213562, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2004) (“[C]ourts may consider events
after the date infringement began as a basis for inferring what the pre-infringe-
ment negotiated value of a license would have been.”).
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Application of the Doctrine—There are two rationales for
applying the book of wisdom doctrine, which point to very dif-
ferent uses of ex post information.  One rationale is evidentiary.
Without an established market price, it is difficult to discern
what the parties expected ex ante or what royalty they would
have negotiated.131  Later events can be evidence of what the
parties thought at the time.132  For example, as one commenta-
tor has noted, “actual sales might be a reasonable guide to the
parties’ forecast of sales at the time of the hypothetical negotia-
tion if there is no evidence that the parties were substantially
surprised by actual events.”133
This appears to be what the Federal Circuit actually did in
Fromson and is in principle an appropriate use of ex post infor-
mation (setting aside practical concerns about whether such ex
post information might be unduly prejudicial in practice).  It
maintains the focus on determining the parties’ ex ante posi-
tions and does not introduce considerations unrelated to the ex
ante market value of the patented technology—such as lock-in
costs.  Some courts have adopted this limited approach.134
But there is a second rationale for using the book of wis-
dom that is more problematic.  This rationale is substantive.
Some courts and commentators argue that a purely ex ante
hypothetical negotiation can undercompensate patent hold-
ers—for example, if profits on the infringing products turn out
to have been higher than the parties projected ex ante.135
131 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 166–67. R
132 See id.; Gregory K. Leonard, Comments on Evolving IP Marketplace, FTC
Project No. P093900, at 14.
133 Leonard, supra note 132, at 14. R
134 See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869–72
(Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (remanding for
reconsideration of damages and instructing the district court to consider how the
parties would have valued the patented invention at the time of the hypothetical
negotiation); Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court’s consideration of an ex post settle-
ment agreement, finding that it was probative of the parties’ expectations at the
time of the hypothetical negotiation); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semi-
conductor Int’l, Inc., No. C 09–5235 MMC, 2014 WL 4437631, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2014) (“While Dr. Putnam did, as noted, look at actual sales figures from
subsequent years, he explained that his opinion as to a reasonable royalty was
based on losses the parties reasonably would have anticipated in light of informa-
tion available to them at the time of the negotiation . . . .” (citations omitted)); St.
Clair, 2004 WL 2213562, at *2–3 (“[C]ourts may consider events after the date
infringement began as a basis for inferring what the pre-infringement negotiated
value of a license would have been.”).
135 See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“If, for example, sales were increased because of [an] in-
fringing use . . . , that fact could affect the amount of royalties a potential licensee
would be willing to pay.”); Honeywell, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 464–66 (arguing that
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Under the paradigmatic story, in which the infringer is seen as
the guilty party, this outcome might be thought to give the
infringer a windfall.  Some courts have thus suggested that this
outcome would not meet the requirements of the Patent Act
because the patent holder would not be fully compensated for
“the use made of the invention by the infringer.”136
This rationale leads to the use of ex post evidence to sup-
plant, rather than merely clarify, the bargain that would have
resulted from an ex ante hypothetical negotiation.137  It embod-
ies two substantive mistakes:  First, the rationale assumes that
the actual profits would have been unforeseen entirely at the
time of the hypothetical negotiation, when the parties negotiat-
ing ex ante would likely have understood that there would be a
range of possible outcomes (some leading to higher profit and
some leading to little or no profit for the infringer) and would
have taken all of them into account in selecting a reasonable
royalty ex ante.  Second, as we explain below, a royalty deter-
mined on the basis of ex post evidence will generally include a
premium based on ex post economic developments that in-
crease the infringer’s reliance on the patent—in particular,
lock-in costs—and that are unrelated to the incremental bene-
fit the patent confers.138
There is another problem with this approach.  Because the
rationale is meant to avoid undercompensating the patent
holder, often the only ex post information considered is that
which tends to increase the royalty rate.  Ex post information
that would tend to reduce the royalty, such as evidence that
actual profits were less than what the parties would have ex-
pected, is often ignored.139
section 284 contemplated consideration of ex post data so as not to undercom-
pensate the patent holder); see also Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 9, at 801 (“[I]f R
realized profits greatly exceed expected profits, a reasonable royalty determined
using only ex ante information may substantially undercompensate the patent
holder.”).
136 Honeywell, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 465 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2012)).
137 See id. at 464–66; Leonard, supra note 132, at 14.  As Judge Gooding has R
demonstrated, such use of ex post information is inconsistent with market valua-
tion practices in other contexts such as tax, accounting, and estate administra-
tion. See Martha K. Gooding, Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages: A Proper
Reading of the Book of Wisdom, BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (2014).
138 See supra section III.A.3.
139 See, e.g., Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d
1371, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that evidence of lower-than-projected
sales could not be used to reduce reasonable royalty); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (upholding royalty rate of
10% even though it exceeded the infringer’s actual profits); Hanson v. Alpine
Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming reasonable
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In short, the evidentiary version of the book of wisdom rule
does not systematically overcompensate patent holders, but
the substantive version does.140  In practice, courts use both,
and there is no consensus in the cases that the evidentiary
version represents the better policy.  In Honeywell Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,141 for example, the
court expressly considered both versions and opted for the
substantive one out of a desire to avoid undercompensating the
patent holder.142
Even where the evidentiary version is used, moreover, ex
post information may still contaminate the hypothetical negoti-
ation if it is not used with careful focus on its limited eviden-
tiary purpose.143
2. Ex Post Contamination via the Georgia-Pacific Factors
The Georgia-Pacific factors themselves introduce ex post
contamination into the hypothetical negotiation in two ways.
First, the “comparable” licenses to be considered are often the
product of ex post bargaining and therefore reflect ex post con-
siderations such as lock-in costs, as well as premiums to ac-
count for uncertainty related to potential litigation
outcomes.144  Second, several of the other Georgia-Pacific fac-
tors consider the total ex post value of the patent in the infring-
ing product, rather than the incremental benefit compared to
the best ex ante alternative.145
royalty that left infringer with no profit on the grounds that “[w]hether, as events
unfurled thereafter, [the infringer] would have made an actual profit, while paying
the royalty determined as of [the date of first infringement], is irrelevant” (quoting
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1164 (6th Cir.
1978)).
140 See Leonard, supra note 132, at 14. R
141 378 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Del. 2005).
142 See id. at 464–66.
143 See, e.g., Aqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, 774 F.3d 766, 770–71 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (“In hypothetical-negotiation terms, the core economic question is what
the infringer, in a hypothetical pre-infringement negotiation under hypothetical
conditions, would have anticipated the profit-making potential of use of the pat-
ented technology to be, compared to using non-infringing alternatives.”); Rem-
brandt Social Media, LP v. Facebook, Inc., 561 F. App’x 909, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he aim of the reasonable-royalty calculation is to measure the market value of
the invention itself—what it is worth to potential users, compared to their using
only noninfringing technologies.”); Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The economic relationship between the patented method
and non-infringing alternative methods, of necessity, would limit the hypothetical
negotiation.”); Hughes Tool Co. v. G. W. Murphy Indus., 491 F.2d 923, 930–31
(5th Cir. 1973) (“The existence of a non-infringing alternative reduces the value of
the patent and thus the damages from infringement.”).
144 See infra subsection III.A.2.a.
145 See infra subsection III.A.2.b.
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a. Factors Directed to Comparable Licenses
The first two Georgia-Pacific factors relate to comparable
licenses.  Factor 1 addresses the royalties that the patent
holder has received for licensing the patent-in-suit.146  Factor 2
addresses the royalties that have been paid for comparable
patents.147
This reliance on comparable licenses is problematic for
several reasons.  First, it is often difficult to ascertain the ac-
tual terms of the entire agreement between the parties and to
determine the royalties paid for the patents-in-suit.148  Patent
holders, knowing that their licenses will influence royalty
awards in future litigation, have an incentive to structure their
agreements in ways that exaggerate the apparent cost of the
licenses to the licensees.  For example, they can provide vari-
ous types of consideration in addition to the patent license
itself and allocate a disproportionate share of the total amount
paid by the licensee for the package to the patent license.  The
licensee will generally have little or no incentive to resist such a
disproportionate allocation because it will have a license and
will not be affected by the patent holder’s use of the license as a
benchmark in negotiations or litigation with other technology
users.
Second, many licenses—especially those in fields with a
“develop without full preclearance” dynamic—are negotiated
after the licensee has already begun practicing the licensed
patent.149  At that point, the infringer is already locked in to the
patented technology and is likely to agree to a license fee that is
far greater than the fee to which it would have agreed ex ante,
when it was not locked in.  But this increase in the infringer’s
willingness to pay does not reflect any increase in the merits of
the patented technology.
Third, virtually all licenses—even those that do not arise
directly out of litigation—are negotiated in “the shadow of the
law” and reflect the parties’ litigation expectations.150  In the
case of ex post licenses, the implementer has already commit-
146 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
147 Id.
148 See Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 280, 300–01 (2010).
149 See supra subpart II.B.
150 The term originated in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979)
(noting that “[d]ivorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth
and custodial prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law”).
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ted the allegedly infringing acts and knows that the likely alter-
native to a negotiated license is litigation.  The implementer no
longer has the option of walking away from the deal and not
using the technology.  The amount the implementer is willing
to pay for a license is largely driven, not by the value of the
patented technology relative to the best alternative, but by the
implementer’s prediction about the consequences of litigation.
In an ex ante bargain, by contrast, the implementer can walk
away and the alternative to taking a license is the next-best
commercial option, not litigation.151
Patent lawsuits are notoriously expensive152 and notori-
ously uncertain.153  As explained in subpart III.B below, vari-
ous limitations on the litigation process tend to lead courts and
juries to overestimate the value of the patents-in-suit when
determining damages.  Further, collateral considerations—
such as the harm that even a nonmeritorious allegation of
patent infringement could have with respect to potential inves-
tors, customers, or ongoing business operations—may prompt
firms to agree to pay a license for an amount far greater than
the benefit conferred by the patent itself.154  Thus, firms regu-
larly pay a premium to avoid litigation, even for licenses to
patents of questionable value.155
151 Royalty rates agreed to in an ex ante bargain might be less than the appro-
priate reasonable royalty remedy because the negotiated rate will sometimes em-
body a discount to reflect the possibility that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
Court-ordered royalties are determined on the assumption that the patent is valid
and infringed. See infra section III.D.1.
152 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35
(2013) (reporting that average litigation costs for a patent infringement action
increased to roughly $2.4 million, when the amount in dispute was $1–25 million,
or $5 million, when over $25 million was in dispute); Hon. Kathleen M. O’Malley et
al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District
Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 681 (2004) (stating that “run of the mill”
patent cases cost $1.2 million in attorneys’ fees to get through claim
construction).
153 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents,
91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 132–37 (2006).
154 See, e.g., Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisi-
tions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 472–75 (2014) (“[A patent-assertion entity] can file a
significant lawsuit just prior to the target’s IPO or other funding event.  If the
lawsuit scares off investors, the news could drive down the price of the IPO.  This
threat can allow the [patent-assertion entity] to extract a significant fraction of the
value of the business in the form of licensing payments.”).
155 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 148, at 289 (“Even though the parties do not R
litigate in equilibrium, the rules regarding injunctions and damages do affect the
equilibrium royalty rate because they affect the parties’ payoffs from litigation,
and the parties negotiate a licensing agreement in the shadow of litigation.”); see
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Courts have recognized that licenses negotiated to settle
litigation should not be considered under Georgia-Pacific Fac-
tors 1 and 2 because they are “tainted by the coercive environ-
ment of patent litigation,”156 but they have failed to recognize
that virtually all ex post licenses share this taint because they
are negotiated in the shadow of litigation.  As a result, the
royalties agreed to in seemingly “comparable” ex post licenses
considered under the Georgia-Pacific factors are inflated to re-
flect litigation considerations unrelated to the ex ante value of
the patent itself.157
b. Other Factors Directed to Ex Post Valuation of the
Patent
Ex post considerations also make their way into the hypo-
thetical negotiation through other Georgia-Pacific factors that
consider the ex post benefits of the infringing product overall,
without regard to whether those benefits would have affected
the hypothetical ex ante license negotiations in the particular
case.  These include:
Factor 6: “The effect of selling the patented specialty in pro-
moting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing
value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of
his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or
convoyed sales.”158
Factor 8: “The established profitability of the product made
under the patent; its commercial success; and its current
popularity.”159
Factor 10: “The nature of the patented invention; the charac-
ter of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and pro-
also infra section III.D.1 (discussing the effect of injunction law on licenses to
avoid litigation).
156 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 77–78 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); see also Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075,
1078–79 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that offers made after “litigation was threatened
or probable” are not evidence of established royalties).
157 In theory, some ex post licenses could result in lower royalties if the ex post
developments indicate that the patent is less valuable than would have been
expected ex ante.  But lock-in would counteract this effect.  More important, pat-
ent holders are likely to focus their enforcement efforts on patents that have
succeeded ex post, not those that have proven to have little if any value (though, of
course, some patent holders—such as those whose products have failed in the
marketplace—may turn to litigation in an attempt to monetize even commercially
unsuccessful patents).
158 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
159 Id.
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duced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have
used the invention.”160
Factor 11: “The extent to which the infringer has made use
of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of
that use.”161
Factor 13: “The portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or sig-
nificant features or improvements added by the infringer.”162
The use of ex post information encompassed by these fac-
tors tends to overcompensate patent holders because of the
confluence of two elements.  First, patent holders are more
likely to assert patents when they claim technologies used in
commercially valuable products than when the products in
which they are used have little value.  Second, just as royalties
agreed to ex post are likely to be larger than those agreed to ex
ante, so the Georgia-Pacific factors listed above imply greater
value at a later time, when the commercial prospects of the
products using the patented technology seem assured, than ex
ante, when the commercial prospects are uncertain.
Several of these factors have another, and in some ways
more fundamental, problem.  Factors 6, 8, and 10 explicitly
take into account benefits to the infringer from the combina-
tion of the patented technology and other products or compo-
nents.163  An ex ante bargain would take such matters into
account only to the extent both that they were anticipated and
that neither they nor some alternative source of value would
have been realized if the infringer had chosen an alternative to
the patented technology.  For example, if a different technology
would also have promoted “sales of other products of the licen-
see” (Factor 6), that benefit would not be part of the ex ante
benefit of the patented technology compared to alternatives
and would thus not have been taken into account in determin-
ing the royalty ex ante.  Similarly, to the extent that the infring-
ing product would have been a “commercial success” (Factor 8)
with an alternative technology, the prospect of its ex post suc-
cess would not have inflated the royalty agreed to ex ante.
To avoid or at least minimize these problems, these factors
must be interpreted in light of the best alternative available at
the time of the hypothetical ex ante negotiation.  For example,
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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the “portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to
the invention” (Factor 13) should be interpreted to mean the
incremental profit anticipated ex ante—i.e., the excess profit
from using the patented technology beyond what would have
been obtained using the next-best alternative available on the
hypothetical negotiation date.164  A few judicial decisions have
moved in this direction.165  But most cases continue to treat
the availability of noninfringing alternatives as just another
factor (Factor 9) to be considered on equal footing with the
others.166  Properly understood, however, the alternatives put a
ceiling on the amount a willing licensee would pay ex ante,
because it would not pay more than the patent is worth com-
pared the alternative of not taking a license.167
3. The Hypothetical Negotiation is Often Assumed to
Take Place After Lock-In
Development of the Doctrine—The earliest case to employ
the “hypothetical negotiation” construct to assess a reasonable
royalty for patent infringement—and the first to state that the
negotiation should be set at the time of first infringement—was
A. Mecky Co. v. Garton Toy Co.168  Although several earlier
cases arguably suggested a similar approach by stating that a
reasonable royalty should be based on the “market value” of
the infringed patent, these prior decisions did not explain how
that value should be determined.169
In A. Mecky, a special master awarded a reasonable royalty
of $1 per unit—slightly higher than the defendant’s per unit
164 See generally William C. Rooklidge, Infringer’s Profits Redux: The Analytical
Method of Determining Patent Infringement Reasonable Royalty Damages, PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (Nov. 5, 2014) (demonstrating that, to the extent an
infringer’s profits are taken into account in determining a reasonable royalty,
courts should consider only the anticipated (ex ante) profits rather than the actual
(ex post) profits).
165 See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly by comparing the patented invention to its next-best
available alternative(s)—regardless of whether the alternative(s) were actually pro-
duced and sold during the infringement—can the court discern the market value
of the patent owner’s exclusive right.”).
166 For examples of cases that fail to give particular weight to the incremental
benefit of practicing the claimed invention as compared to the available nonin-
fringing alternatives, see Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. v. Globus Med.,
Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 290, 309–11 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 547, 607–15 (D. Del. 1997); Pentech
Int’l, Inc. v. Hayduchok, 931 F. Supp. 1167, 1174–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
167 See Seaman, supra note 111, at 1711–12. R
168 277 F. 507, 511–13 (E.D. Wis. 1921).
169 See U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914); Bemis
Car Box Co. v. J. G. Brill Co., 200 F. 749, 759 (3d Cir. 1912).
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profit—in light of the defendant’s willful infringement.170  The
district court held that it was error to consider willfulness in
setting the royalty rate171 and that a reasonable royalty should
be determined by “endeavoring to ascertain what these parties
would say to each other, if, being honorable business rivals, the
defendant should desire, and the plaintiff should be willing to
grant, a license upon reasonable terms.”172  The court added
that “[i]t is quite clear that in the application of the rule care
should be taken to ascertain reasonableness of a royalty as of
the time and under the circumstances attending the com-
mencement and duration of the infringement.”173
Other early cases held that reasonable royalties should be
determined with reference to the date of first infringement on
the grounds that that is when the availability of noninfringing
alternatives is relevant to assessing the patent’s value.  The
source of this reasoning can be traced to Columbia Wire Co. v.
Kokomo Steel & Wire Co.174  After noting the general rule that
an infringer is liable for all advantages gained from using an
infringing machine over the next-best alternative, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether the proper comparison was to the
alternatives available at the time the patent issued or to the
alternatives available fifteen years later, when infringement be-
gan.175  The court found that when the patent issued, the best
available alternative was far inferior to the patented technol-
ogy, while at the time infringement began, the best available
alternatives were actually more efficient than the patented
technology and it would have cost the defendant nothing to
switch.176  The court held that “an infringer is only to pay for
the advantages of the patented machine over machines that
were open to his use at the time of the unlawful appropria-
tion.”177  The court reasoned that “[f]ifteen years [after the date
of the patent], when the art has advanced to include other
noninfringing machines, available to manufacturers and more
effective than those of the prior art, the patentee cannot avoid
their competitive effect,” and to make the defendant “pay for
the advantages of the invention over the prior art, would attri-
170 277 F. at 509.
171 Id. at 513.
172 Id. at 511.
173 Id. at 513.
174 194 F. 108, 109–10 (7th Cir. 1911).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
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bute to the patent a virtue it did not really have at the later
period.”178
Subsequent cases applied this method of valuation in the
context of a hypothetical negotiation.  For example, the court in
Dunkley Co. v. Central California Canneries179 relied on A.
Mecky to hold that the royalty “should be fixed at such a sum
as the defendants would probably have consented to pay,
rather than dispense with the [infringing] machine.”180  The
court explained that the royalty should be determined by “evi-
dence showing the nature of the invention, its utility and ad-
vantage”181 over alternatives and that “[t]he royalty should be
fixed in the light of the conditions which obtained when the
infringements took place.”182  Other circuit courts and the
Court of Claims—the appellate division of which is a predeces-
sor court to the Federal Circuit183—similarly assessed reasona-
ble royalties based on a hypothetical negotiation to determine
the value of the asserted patent at the time of first
infringement.184
In Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing
Co.,185 the Seventh Circuit extended this approach in holding
that separate royalty rates should be awarded for a single
course of infringing conduct, based on differences in the value
178 Id. at 110.
179 7 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1925).
180 Id. at 976.
181 Id. at 977.
182 Id. at 976 (emphasis added).
183 See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
184 See, e.g., Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335 (6th
Cir. 1938), cert. denied sub nom. Carrier Eng’g Corp. v. Horvath, 308 U.S. 581
(1939) (“In fixing damages on a royalty basis against an infringer, the sum allowed
should be reasonable and that which would be accepted by a prudent licensee
who wished to obtain a license but was not so compelled and a prudent patentee,
who wished to grant a license but was not so compelled.”); Rockwood v. Gen. Fire
Extinguisher Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1930) (“In fixing the measure of damages
on a royalty basis against an infringer, it should be based on a sum which is
reasonable and indicates a general acquiescence on the part of the prudent pur-
chaser to pay for the increased market value due to the improvement.”); Egry
Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1928) (“In fixing
a reasonable royalty, the primary inquiry, often complicated by secondary ones, is
what the parties would have agreed upon, if both were reasonably trying to reach
an agreement.”); Austin-W. Rd. Mach. Co. v. Disc Grader & Plow Co., 291 F. 301,
304 (8th Cir. 1923) (holding that a “reasonable royalty” should reflect the “amount
a person desiring to manufacture and sell the patented article would, as a busi-
ness proposition, be willing to pay as a royalty”); Olsson v. United States, 25 F.
Supp. 495, 499 (Ct. Cl. 1938) (“The question to be determined is, What was the
invention worth in the market?  What would the parties have taken and paid if the
matter had come to an express agreement?” (quoting Wood v. United States, 36
Ct. Cl. 418, 426 (Ct. Cl. 1901)).
185 282 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1960).
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of practicing the patent as compared to the noninfringing alter-
natives available at different periods of time.186  However, the
Federal Circuit has more recently held that, while separate acts
of infringement involving “vastly different” products may be
accorded separate hypothetical negotiation dates,187 in cases
involving a single course of conduct a single reasonable royalty
rate should be assessed based on the date of first
infringement.188
Application of the Doctrine—Doctrinally, the hypothetical
negotiation is presumed to occur at or just before the time
infringement began.189  While it is well established that the
negotiation may be set prior to the earliest infringement at
issue in a particular case (for example, in cases where the
patent holder cannot seek damages for the initial acts of in-
fringement because of the statute of limitations or other bars to
recovery),190 it is not clear what the relevant date should be.191
Courts have variously used the date of the first infringing
use,192 the first infringing sale,193 the first infringing manufac-
ture,194 and the design and testing of the infringing product.195
The FTC has suggested, on policy grounds, that the date the
infringer first contemplated infringement should be used in-
186 Id. at 678.
187 Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted).  The court indicated that separate products that
are identical with respect to infringement issues could constitute the “same in-
fringement” for purposes of setting a single hypothetical negotiation date. See id.
at 1362–64.
188 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 76 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“[I]n each case there should be only a single hypothetical negotiation date,
not separate dates for separate acts of infringement . . . .”).
189 See VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2009)); Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). But see
infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing authorities holding that, in the R
case of a standard-essential patent, the hypothetical negotiation should be set at
the time the patent became essential to the standard).
190 See, e.g., LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 76 (holding that the hypothetical
negotiation should not be set at the date when the induced infringement began
(i.e., when the defendant first learned of the patent), but when the underlying acts
of direct infringement by others began three years earlier); Wang Labs., Inc. v.
Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
191 Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 9, at 804. R
192 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1116 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
193 Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
194 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1123
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
195 Oracle, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
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stead.196  What is clear, however, is that the date is set in many
cases after the infringer has taken steps that have caused it to
be locked in to the patented technology.197
Most IT products, for example, require extensive vertical
and horizontal integration of complements and components.
Individual devices (such as cellular telephones or laptop com-
puters) are comprised of thousands of separate components
that must be configured to interoperate, and the larger devices
similarly must be configured to interoperate with external de-
vices (cellular towers, wireless networks, etc.).198  Software
must work with hardware, client devices with servers, storage
devices with readers, and so on.
Anticipating these coordination requirements, a manufac-
turer might take substantial steps to arrange for complements
and components even before it completes the testing and man-
ufacture, or even the detailed design, of the infringing product.
Manufacturers can thus be effectively locked in to numerous
technologies long before any actual acts of infringement.
The hypothetical negotiation date should be set at just
prior to the time that the infringer became committed to using
the infringing technology, which in most cases will be the lock-
in date.  Consistent with traditional doctrine,199 this provides
the optimal framework for assessing the incremental benefit
conferred by the claimed technology as compared to available
alternatives.  Setting the hypothetical negotiation at a later
date may allow the patent holder to extract a lock-in pre-
mium.200  But as explained above, current law remains unset-
tled with respect to the “first infringement” that determines the
date of the hypothetical negotiation and can thus result in the
196 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 22. R
197 See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (setting hypothetical negotiation at date of first infringement, which was the
date that patent issued); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575
F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978) (setting hypothetical negotiation at date of first
infringement, which began on date that patent issued, even though defendant had
been making and selling products five years before patent issued).
198 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2016. R
199 See supra notes 174–84 and accompanying text.
200 In circumstances where infringers make timing decisions unconstrained
by lock-in, it might be appropriate to assess different reasonable royalties based
on different hypothetical negotiation dates for early movers (who may have as-
sumed greater commercial risk in implementing the infringing technology before it
was tested in the marketplace) and late adopters (who may have delayed imple-
mentation until the infringing technology was commercially successful).  In both
cases, however, the royalty should be assessed based on the incremental value of
practicing the patent over the next-best alternative available just prior to the time
that the infringer committed to the infringing technology.
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hypothetical negotiation being set well after lock-in.  In this
way, too, ex post information may contaminate the reasonable
royalty calculation.
B. Litigation Overestimates the Value of the Patent
Relative to Other Components
Reasonable royalty determinations are also inflated simply
because they arise out of the litigation process.  This is espe-
cially so when the patented technology is just a small compo-
nent of a larger product.  When thousands of patents or other
inputs are involved in the same device, judges and juries con-
sistently and systematically overemphasize the value of the
single patent (or patents) at issue as compared to all the other
inputs.201
Litigation has two characteristics that drive this outcome.
First, trial time is limited, and there simply is not enough of it
to fully explore all of the other technologies and inputs that add
value to a product.202  It takes significant time to explain any
single technology and its benefits.  Thus, the fact-finder hears a
great deal about the benefits of the patents-in-suit from the
patent holder but, for lack of time, much less about the value of
the myriad other technologies and other inputs in the infring-
ing product.203  The fact-finder thus naturally tends to
overvalue the former’s contribution.
Second, research by psychologists shows that an individ-
ual’s judgments are heavily biased toward the “anchor” on
which he or she initially focused.204  In virtually every patent
201 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2148.  Patent holders understand this R
and thus often refuse to license component manufacturers that infringe their
patents, so that they can instead assert their patents against manufacturers of
more valuable downstream products whose value reflects the combination of ad-
ditional inputs other than the patented technology.  These patent holders make
that choice even though refusing to license component manufacturers and assert-
ing patents instead against manufacturers of downstream product generally in-
creases transaction costs and enables a larger portion of the infringing products
to escape having to pay for use of the patented technology. See Prepared State-
ment for the Record of Intel Corporation for the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Sub-
comm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights on Standard
Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of A.
Douglas Melamed, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Intel Corp.).
202 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2148. R
203 Id.
204 See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask
for, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 519, 533–38 (1996) (noting anchoring effects on causality judgments,
compensation awards, and litigant perceptions in juror simulations); Gretchen B.
Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments of
Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
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case, this will be the patents-in-suit.  This too suggests that the
patented technologies are likely to be systematically overvalued
at trial, particularly in the common scenario where the patent
holder—in an effort to invoke the “entire market value rule”—
asserts that the patent-practicing component or feature pro-
vides the basis for the market demand for the accused
product.205
C. The Special Case of Standard-Essential Patents
To this point, we have discussed ways in which our current
system’s approach to addressing perceived undercompensa-
tion of infringed patents tends to ignore the now-pervasive
practice of overcompensating patent holders.  In one area of
patent litigation, however, courts have noticed the risk of sys-
temic ex post overcompensation and have tried—at least in
part—to limit royalties to an ex ante valuation: patents that
must be practiced in order to comply with industry-wide stan-
dards, referred to as “standard-essential patents” (SEPs).206
A standard-setting organization (SSO) is an organization
that develops and promulgates technical standards, most often
to facilitate compatibility and interoperability within a particu-
lar technical area.207  The standards embody industry-wide so-
120, 120–21 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (col-
lecting empirical studies demonstrating the anchoring effect); Birte Englich,
Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word in Court—A Hidden Disadvan-
tage for the Defense, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 706–08 (2005) (discussing
anchoring).
205 Under current doctrine, the reasonable royalty rate is generally applied to a
royalty base that consists of the revenues attributable to no more than the small-
est saleable patent-practicing unit, rather than all of the revenues attributable to
the infringing product.  And, for a patent that represents a portion of the value of
the smallest saleable unit, further apportionment to reflect the value of the patent
is required. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“Where the smallest salable unit is, in fact, a multi-component product
containing several non-infringing features with no relation to the patented fea-
ture . . . , the patentee must do more to estimate what portion of the value of that
product is attributable to the patented technology.”); cf. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link
Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232–33 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Just as we apportion dam-
ages for a patent that covers a small part of a device, we must also apportion
damages for SEPs that cover only a small part of a standard.”).  However, in cases
where the infringing feature is responsible for the consumer demand for the
product, the “entire market value rule” permits the total product revenues to be
used as the royalty base. See, e.g., VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1326.
206 See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 191 (discussing standard- R
setting organizations).  One example is mobile wireless telephony, an industry
where “[i]t is essential that all components involved in this transmission of infor-
mation be able to communicate seamlessly with one another.”  Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2007).
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lutions to the problems of vertical and horizontal integration
discussed in section III.A.3 above, and the solutions usually
generate substantial “network effects” as customers and sup-
pliers of components and complements align around the
standards.208
Although compliance with these standards is normally vol-
untary (absent some manner of government or regulatory in-
corporation),209 once a particular standard is adopted,
compliance with it typically becomes a de facto requirement to
participate in an industry.210  For example, since virtually all
wireless laptops are configured to communicate with wireless
local area networks using the IEEE 802.11 standard, there is
no market for wireless routers that do not comply with that
standard.211
Standardized technology is especially vulnerable to ex post
contamination of the reasonable royalty determination because
lock-in—that is, the inability as a practical matter of technol-
ogy users to choose alternative technologies—usually precedes
infringement.  Once an SSO adopts a standard, the costs asso-
ciated with modifying the standard in order to design around
SEPs are often substantial.212  Lock-in thus frequently occurs
before technology users in the industry have taken any steps
toward using the patented technology.  In this case, however,
the lock-in is not a consequence of product development and
implementation costs incurred by technology users.  It is in-
stead a consequence of the enormous group coordination and
decision-making costs that the SSO and its members have in-
curred to develop and adopt the standard, and that would have
to be incurred again to change or replace it.213
SSOs are mindful of the lock-in effects of their decisions to
include particular technologies in their standards.  Thus, most
SSOs require their members to commit to license any SEPs
they hold on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND)
208 See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Com-
petition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424–26 (1985) (discussing the
network effects of industry-wide standards adoption).
209 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1142
(2013).
210 See Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual
Property, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1043, 1073 (2002) (discussing the increased
consumer demand for products that meet industry-wide standards).
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 191. R
213 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2016. R
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terms.214  SSOs typically do not specify, however, the proper
method for assessing a FRAND royalty rate.215  Courts have
struggled to make such calculations, and no two courts have
taken the same approach.216
Although the law is far from settled, courts generally show
concern about overcompensating standard-essential patent
holders.  Most notably, the Federal Circuit recently flagged ex-
cessive royalties from hold-up by holders of SEPs (because in-
fringers are locked in) and royalty stacking (because of the
large numbers of patents involved in standard-compliant prod-
ucts) as “potential problems” in its 2014 decision in Ericsson,
Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.217  Similarly, both the Ericsson
court and various other courts have determined that patent
holders should not capture the increase in value attributable to
the inclusion of the technologies claimed by their patents in a
standard (with the resulting lock-in and network effects), and
that they are entitled instead to only the value of the patented
technology relative to the next-best alternative before the SSO
decided to include the technology in the standard.218  Thus, at
214 Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Trans-
fers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 233–35 (2014).
215 Id.  The IEEE, however, recently adopted new bylaws specifying that a
“reasonable rate” for an essential patent should be limited to the value that the
claimed functionality contributes to the smallest saleable unit that practices the
claimed invention and must exclude any value resulting from the inclusion of the
patent in the standard. See IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, Approved Clause
6 (2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/approved-
changes.pdf [http://perma.cc/YY3U-4FPV].
216 Compare Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *53 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (holding that in a hypothetical
negotiation, parties would be skeptical about a patent’s relevance to the stan-
dard), with In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (holding that the hypothetical negotiators were pre-
sumed to know that the patents were essential to the standard). See also Anne
Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Dam-
ages: Part 2, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:18 AM) (discussing the different methodol-
ogies applied by different courts), http://www.law360.com/articles/584909/
methodologies-for-calculating-frand-damages-part-2 [http://perma.cc/CG2M-
8BLQ]; A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks at The Intersection of Competition Policy
and Patent Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation Conference 235 (May 26,
2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/evolv
ing-ip-marketplace/transcript-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/RF2Q-XSH3] (“[E]ven for
those who participate in [SSO proceedings and] declared patents, we don’t know
what the FRAND terms will actually end up being . . . .”).
217 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
218 See id. at 1233 (“Because SEP holders should only be compensated for the
added benefit of their inventions, the jury must be told to differentiate the added
benefit from any value the innovation gains because it has become standard
essential.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“[S]tandards threaten to endow holders of standard-essential patents with dis-
proportionate market power.  In theory, once a standard has gained such wide-
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least one court has deemed the date of the hypothetical negoti-
ation to be the date on which the patent became essential to
the standard, rather than the date of first infringement.219
The concern of these courts is appropriate.  It reflects a
recognition that, once the patented technology is written into
the standard, firms may have no realistic choice but to use
it.220  It also presumably reflects an implicit recognition that
the paradigmatic story does not apply and that the infringer
cannot be presumed to be the guilty party.221  The FRAND
spread acceptance that compliance is effectively required to compete in a
particular market, anyone holding a standard-essential patent could extract un-
reasonably high royalties from suppliers of standard-compliant products and
services.  This problem is a form of ‘patent holdup.’”); Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc.,
No. 13–cv–04910–JD, 2015 WL 349197, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015) (“When
the accused technology does not make up the whole of the accused products, and
the patented feature does not drive the demand for the entire product, ‘the ulti-
mate combination of royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the value attributa-
ble to the infringing features of the product, and no more.’” (quoting Ericsson, 773
F.3d at 1226)); SK Hynix Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. C–oo–20905 RMW, 2013 WL
1915865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2013) (“Once compliance with a particular
standard is effectively required to compete in a particular market, the patentee
gains disproportionate bargaining power and may ‘extract unreasonably high
royalties from suppliers of standard-compliant products and services.’  Requiring
that the patent be licensed to all on FRAND terms prevents this type of patent
‘hold-up.’” (quoting Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 876; Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012))).
219 See, e.g., Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 913 (Posner, J., sitting by designa-
tion) (“The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts with what the cost
to the licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the patented invention
was declared essential to compliance with the industry standard, a license for the
function performed by the patent.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 1286
(Fed. Cir. 2014); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 194 (“A definition of R
[F]RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented technology at the time the
standard is set is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition among
technologies to be incorporated into the standard—competition that the standard
setting process itself otherwise displaces. . . .  Courts should cap the royalty at the
incremental value of the patented technology over alternatives available at the
time the standard was defined.”); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential
Patents 2 (Toulouse School of Economics, Working Paper No. IDEI-803, 2014),
http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2014/wp_idei_803_v3.pdf [http://perma.cc/EEH9-
A5LU]; Mark A. Lemley, Remarks at the Evolving IP Marketplace Conference 182
(May 5, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
events/evolving-ip-marketplace/090505transcript.pdf [http://perma.cc/CUD6-
K9SP] (stating that such placement could “solve a lot of the hold-up component of
damages problems in multi-component industries”).
220 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 191–92 (“[O]nce a particular R
patented technology is incorporated in a standard, its adoption eliminates alter-
natives.  At that point, a firm with a patent reading on the standard may have
market power in the relevant technology market.  If so, the patentee can demand a
royalty that reflects not only the ex ante value of the technology compared to
alternatives, but also the value associated with investments made to implement
the standard.” (footnote omitted)).
221 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Or-
ganizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1924 (2002) (“If an IP owner agrees to license its
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commitment means that the patent holder no longer has a
right, presumed in the paradigmatic story, to refuse to license
its patent; by the same token, the infringer is entitled to use the
patented technology and does not need to obtain the consent of
a recalcitrant or mercenary patent holder in order to do so.222
While courts have shown heightened concern in the SEP
context, they have struggled to synthesize the goal of avoiding
overcompensation with the perceived need to consider various
Georgia-Pacific factors that, rooted in the “paradigmatic story”
of patent infringement, take into account ex post developments
that inflate the “reasonable royalty” rate.223  The Federal Cir-
cuit recognized this tension in the Ericsson case: the court
stated that “many of the Georgia-Pacific factors simply are not
relevant; many are even contrary to RAND principles” and held
that it was reversible error to instruct a jury on those Georgia-
Pacific factors.224  The court singled out Factor 8, with its ac-
counting for an invention’s “current popularity,” as being espe-
cially out of sync with FRAND royalty adjudication.225  While
the Federal Circuit did not go so far as to set forth a “modified”
version of the Georgia-Pacific factors for use in the SEP context,
it did instruct district courts to adapt the factors “on a case-by-
case basis depending on the technology at issue.”226
Although it is too soon to determine the full impact of Erics-
son, it seems clear that, even in the FRAND context, ex post
contamination and overcompensation for patent holders re-
patents that cover a standard on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, others
will assume that they are free to use that standard so long as they pay a reasona-
ble royalty.  There may be no express license between the IP owner and any of the
users of the standard, but it seems perfectly reasonable to imply one from the
conduct of the IP owner.”).
222 In Hohfeldian terms, a FRAND commitment functions as “an irrevocable
license [that] creates a use privilege with which the patent owner has no right to
interfere, and . . . bestows on the standard adopter a right to negotiate [a reasona-
ble license fee] that the patent owner has a duty to recognize.”  Kesan & Hayes,
supra note 214, at 290–01; see generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Funda- R
mental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)
(setting forth Hohfeld’s original framework defining and establishing the relation-
ships between various legal concepts).
223 Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, supra note 216; see also Golden Bridge Tech. R
v. Apple Inc., No. 5:12–cv–04882–PSG, 2014 WL 2194501, at *4 n.51 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 2014) (collecting cases in which courts relied on modified Georgia-Pacific
factors); Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (refusing to apply Georgia-Pacific
factors because of ambiguity).
224 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230–31 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
225 Id. (distinguishing as irrelevant and/or misleading Factors 9 and 10 in the
FRAND context).
226 Id. at 1231.
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main a serious concern.227  For example, Ericsson did not rule
out the admissibility and consideration of ex post licenses.
And so long as Georgia-Pacific (even subject to modification)
persists as the default guiding framework, determinations of
reasonable royalties for SEPs are likely to be based on inconsis-
tent, ad hoc methodologies that fail to limit a “reasonable roy-
alty” to the incremental benefit provided by the patent itself.228
D. Current Law Relating to Future Remedies
Overcompensates Patent Holders
1. Ongoing Royalties Overcompensate Patent Holders
Yet another avenue for ex post contamination is the emerg-
ing doctrine concerning royalties for posttrial infringement.  As
discussed in section I.B.2 above, the Federal Circuit’s Paice
and Amado decisions held that courts may assess ongoing roy-
alty rates that are greater than the reasonable royalties as-
sessed for presuit infringement, and these postverdict rates
may take into account ex post developments.  The resulting law
is likely to lead to excessive royalties for two reasons.
First, the rationale for distinguishing between pre- and
postverdict “reasonable royalty” rates makes little sense.  It is
black-letter law that the preverdict hypothetical ex ante negoti-
ation presumes the patent to be both valid and infringed.229
Jury findings of validity and infringement, therefore, provide no
basis for increasing the postverdict rate.230  The erroneous view
that such findings should lead to a forward-looking royalty rate
227 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041 (9th Cir.
2015) (approving district court’s partial consideration of patents’ “present-day
value” in setting FRAND royalty rate); see also Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, supra
note 216 (“Thus far, courts have favored modified versions of the Georgia-Pacific R
factors to recreate a hypothetical negotiation between the parties as the best
starting point for FRAND assessments.”).
228 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d at 1041 (approving district court’s
method of setting a FRAND royalty rate, including its modification of the Georgia-
Pacific factors and its consideration of patents’ “present-day value”); Realtek
Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C–12–03451–RMW, 2014 WL 46997, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014) (permitting evidence and argument regarding appropriate
FRAND royalty rate based on consideration of third-party licenses to various
portfolios that encompassed patents in addition to the patents-in-suit).
229 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2009).  District courts have also taken notice of this tension. See Univ. of Pitts-
burgh v. Varian Med. Sys., No. 08–cv–1307, 2012 WL 1436569, at *11 (W.D. Pa.
Apr. 25, 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 561 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“The jury was instructed to assume, for purposes of the damages portion of the
trial, that the . . . patent was valid and was being infringed . . . .”).
230 Mark A. Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties, 76 MO. L.
REV. 695, 704 (2011) [hereinafter Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion].
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greater than the reasonable royalty for past infringement leads
to overcompensation of patent holders.231
Second, the Amado factors instruct courts to consider the
parties’ posttrial economic circumstances in setting the new
royalty rate.  This is an invitation to take the defendants’ lock-
in costs into account and to award the patent holder a pre-
mium based upon them.232
Since Amado, dozens of district courts have awarded ongo-
ing royalties much larger (in some cases, many times larger)
than the preverdict royalties.233  A few trial courts, however,
appear to have recognized the doctrinal inconsistency and have
pushed back against further inflation of the royalty rate.234
2. The Threat of an Injunction or Exclusion Order Can
Lead to Overcompensation for Patent Holders
The threat of an injunction (or similar prohibition against
infringement) is yet another avenue by which negotiated li-
censes overcompensate patent holders.  As a remedy, injunc-
tions are—in most circumstances—very costly to the
defendant.235  In some cases, an injunction may order an in-
fringer to stop selling or importing a particular product, in
231 Although it arguably contravenes the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury
trial on patent damages for the judge to reevaluate the hypothetical negotiation to
set an ongoing royalty, courts effectively treat ongoing royalties as a form of
injunctive relief. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315–16
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
232 See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(suggesting that the preverdict reasonable royalty of $0.04 should be the floor and
the $2.00 that plaintiff was requesting should be the ceiling for setting ongoing
royalties on remand); Lemley, The Ongoing Confusion, supra note 230, at 703–04. R
233 See, e.g., Bos. Sci. Corp. v. Cordis Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265, 282 (D.
Del. 2012) (ordering ongoing royalty rate over ten times jury’s original rate); Joyal
Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172 (JAP), 2009 WL 512156, at
*13 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009) (ordering ongoing royalty rate 4.5 times jury’s original
rate).
234 See, e.g., WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., No. 11–cv–10374–NMG, 2014 WL
585854, at *9 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014) (determining that Paice “does not foreclose
setting an identical rate to that found by the jury” and according the jury’s rate
“considerable deference”); Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 6:05 CV
322, 2008 WL 8856865, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2008) (“Orion has not shown
how the situation now is any different than that presented at trial, which justified
the two percent royalty rate.  Accordingly, two percent remains an appropriate
royalty rate for postverdict infringement.”).
235 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1992–93 (“Injunction threats often R
involve a strong element of holdup in the common circumstance in which the
defendant has already invested heavily to design, manufacture, market, and sell
the product with the allegedly infringing feature. . . . [T]he threat of an injunction
can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent
holder’s true economic contribution.”).  An injunction may prohibit a party from
engaging in behavior that it has already ceased or can cease promptly with limited
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which case the infringer would either have to bear the lock-in
costs or lose its investment and the prospect of future profits
from the enjoined business.236  Even when an injunction pro-
hibits the infringer only from employing a single component or
feature, it may be onerous for the infringer to separate the
infringing instrumentality from the noninfringing ones.237
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s eBay decision
reset the table for permanent injunctions—particularly for
nonpracticing entities.238  In the years following eBay, district
courts began denying permanent injunctions with increasing
frequency, and the Federal Circuit has generally affirmed those
decisions.239  But even with these developments, uncertainties
remain.  Injunctions may still be available in cases brought by
practicing entities (particularly market competitors)240 even
post-eBay, courts have awarded some nonpracticing entities
permanent injunctions.241
repercussions, in which case the injunction imposes minimal costs as a practical
matter.
236 Id. at 2009 (“[P]atentees regularly settle with companies in the information
technology industries for far more money than their inventions are actually worth.
These companies are paying holdup money to avoid the threat of infringement.
That is not a legitimate part of the value of a patent; it is a windfall to the patent
owner . . . .”).
237 See, e.g., Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1093 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 616 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (granting injunction
against seller of VCRs to holder of patent for “Loading Mechanism for a Video
Cassette”); see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2010 (explaining that R
infringers are often unable to “separate the infringing component from the nonin-
fringing ones after the fact”).
238 In the first year after eBay, courts awarded no injunctions in the four cases
involving nonpracticing patent holders.  Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory Li-
cense: Facilitating License Negotiation for Efficient Post-Verdict Patent Infringe-
ment, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 427, 434 tbl.1 (2008).
239 See Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings by District Courts, PAT-
STATS.ORG, http://www.patstats.org/Injunction_rulings_post-eBay_to_12-31-
2013.xls [http://perma.cc/N67Y-TT3B] (cataloging district court cases through
2013); Ernest Grumbles, III, Rachel C. Hughey & Susan Perera, The Three Year
Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical Analysis of Permanent Injunc-
tions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (2009), http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/arti
cles/three-year-anniversary-eBay-MercExchange.asp [http://perma.cc/ZYR2-
E3WS].
240 See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (affirming district court’s grant of permanent injunction where the parties
were direct competitors).
241 See, e.g., Joyal Prods. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172 (JAP),
2009 WL 512156, at *11 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009) (granting injunction to company
that previously practiced but had since ceased operations and sought to sell the
patent); CSIRO v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608 (E.D. Tex. 2007)
(granting injunction to the Australian Federal Government’s principal scientific
research organization).
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Moreover, because of the additional leverage that the
threat of an injunction provides, nonpracticing entities—fully
aware of the impact of eBay—have altered their strategic be-
havior, most notably by bringing an increasing number of pat-
ent infringement claims to the International Trade Commission
(ITC).242  Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC
may issue an exclusion order barring the importation of goods
that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights,243 and eBay’s
four-factor test does not apply to ITC exclusion orders.244  Al-
though a patent holder must satisfy the ITC’s “domestic indus-
try” requirement in order to bring a section 337 complaint,245
the Federal Circuit has found that nonpracticing entities may
meet this requirement through licensing and litigation activi-
ties.246  The statute provides, somewhat cryptically, that the
242 See K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for
Repealing Section 337, 708 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 5 (Sept. 19, 2012) (linking an in-
crease in ITC cases to an influx of cases brought by nonpracticing entities);
Timothy B. Lee, ITC: How an Obscure Bureaucracy Makes the World Safe for
Patent Trolls, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 21, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2012/09/itc-how-an-obscure-bureaucracy-makes-the-world-safe-
for-patent-trolls/ [http://perma.cc/AB5P-CXHQ].
243 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2), (d) (2012).  The ITC may not award
damages. Id. § 1337(d)–(f).
244 Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2010).  In June 2013, the White House, as part of its efforts to address “frivolous
[patent] litigation,” recommended that Congress “[c]hange the ITC standard for
obtaining an injunction to better align it with the traditional four-factor test in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, to enhance consistency in the standards applied at
the ITC and district courts.”  Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: White House
Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-
task-force-high-tech-patent-issues [http://perma.cc/Z6YF-LPN7] (emphasis
omitted).
245 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2)–(3).  The statute provides that the ITC should
not issue an exclusion order if it concludes, “after considering the effect of such
exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the
United States economy, . . . [and] consumers,” that the infringing “articles should
not be excluded,” id. § 1337(d)(1), but the ITC has not construed this provision to
provide a basis for declining to issue an exclusion order to an NPE.
246 See InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 707 F.3d 1295,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[A]s long as the party seeking relief can show that it has a
sufficiently substantial investment in the exploitation of the intellectual property
to satisfy the domestic industry requirement of the statute, that party is entitled
to seek relief under section 337.”).  To satisfy the domestic industry requirement,
however, a patent holder must direct licensing or litigation efforts at “encourag[ing
the] adoption and development of articles that incorporated [the patent holder’s]
patented technology.”  Motiva, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 716 F.3d 596, 600–01
(Fed. Cir. 2013); see also John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
660 F.3d 1322, 1328–30 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that a patent holder failed to
meet the domestic industry requirement where it had not engaged in prelitigation
licensing or offered to license the patent to any party other than its litigation
opponents).
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ITC “shall” issue an exclusion order “unless” it finds that the
infringing articles “should not be excluded” after considering
“the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and wel-
fare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and United States consumers.”247  The ITC has never
declined to issue an exclusion order because the infringed pat-
ent is an SEP or because the patent holder is a nonpracticing
entity.248
Both an exclusion order and an injunction can impose po-
tentially devastating costs on a firm.249  Infringers are thus
likely to agree to pay more in royalties in an ex post license
than the value of the patented technology in order to avoid even
a small risk of an injunction or exclusion order.250  The pros-
pect of the resulting inflated royalties encourages “lie-in-wait
behavior” on the part of patent holders, who recognize that they
may be able to obtain significantly greater license fees after
infringement is underway and the infringer is locked in.251
247 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
248 All ITC exclusion orders, however, are subject to the approval or disap-
proval of the President, and the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Froman,
has stated that any such orders based on standard-essential patents will be
subject to particular scrutiny.  Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador,
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, to the Honorable Irving A. Williamson,
Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) (on file with author).  Most
notably, in Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices,
Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, the ITC issued
an exclusion order with respect to several Apple products found to infringe an
allegedly standard-essential patent.  78 Fed. Reg. 34,669 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n
June 10, 2013).  Ambassador Froman explained that, due to the potential for
patent hold-up, exclusions based on standard-essential patents pose a particular
risk of harming the public interest. He then disapproved the ITC order—the first
time that any Administration had done so in over twenty-five years.  Letter from
Froman, supra note 248, at 3; see also Brian X. Chen, Obama Administration R
Overturns Ban on Apple Products, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Aug. 3, 2013, 4:23 PM), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/obama-administration-overturns-ban-on-
apple-products/ [http://perma.cc/V2S3-LPE7].
249 For example, in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 3:01CV767,
2003 WL 23100881 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003), after the jury awarded about $33.5
million in damages and the court ordered an injunction, the parties settled for
$612.5 million. See Mark Heinzl & Amol Sharma, RIM to Pay NTP $612.5 Million
to Settle Blackberry Patent Suit, WALL ST. J.: GETTING THE MESSAGE (Mar. 4, 2006,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114142276287788965 [http://
perma.cc/YLY5-T3RY].
250 See Heinzl & Sharma, supra note 249; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra R
note 3, at 226 (“Hold-up gives the patentee more compensation than it could have R
earned through competition in the technology market.”); Morton & Shapiro, supra
note 154, at 473 (“Risk averse business executives may be willing to pay signifi- R
cantly higher royalties rather than accept even a small risk of an exclusion
order.”).
251 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 227. R
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E. Inflated Litigation Royalties Lead to Inflated Rates for
Negotiated Licenses, Which in Turn Feed Back into
Future Litigation Royalties
The current reasonable royalty doctrine systematically
overcompensates patent holders in damages awards.  That is
Phase One of the vicious cycle.
Inflated litigation awards, in turn, lead to inflated royalties
agreed to in ex post license agreements because, as explained
in subpart III.A, parties negotiate those agreements in the
shadow of litigation.252  The more the parties anticipate that
the patent holder would get from litigation, the more an in-
fringer must and would pay to avoid litigation.253  In short,
inflated litigation royalties lead to inflated negotiated license
rates.  That is Phase Two of the vicious cycle.
There is also a Phase Three of the feedback loop, in which
the inflated license rates feed back into future reasonable roy-
alty calculations in litigation and perpetuate their inflated
levels.  As discussed above, the first two Georgia-Pacific factors
bring “comparable licenses” prominently into the reasonable
royalty calculation,254 and these factors (especially licenses for
the patents-in-suit) are often given great weight in the reasona-
ble royalty analysis.255  But the comparable licenses courts
consider under Georgia-Pacific are themselves overvalued, in
part because of the exaggerated litigation damages from Phase
One of the cycle.  When these inflated license royalties are
252 Id. at 57 (“Ex post licensing negotiations . . . are largely driven by how the
parties believe they will fare in infringement litigation, including the size of any
potential damages award.”); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1992. R
253 This litigation-driven royalty inflation exists also in sectors that do not
have a “develop without full preclearance” dynamic, albeit to a lesser degree.
Parties also negotiate ex ante licenses in the shadow of litigation because one
alternative to taking a license, especially where there is substantial doubt as to
whether the contemplated product or process would infringe a valid patent, is to
infringe and litigate.  The higher the expected litigation damages in that situation,
the more a technology user is likely to be willing to agree to a license ex ante.
254 See supra subsection III.A.2.a.
255 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., Inc., 341 F.3d 1370, 1382, n.4
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Prior agreements ‘carry considerable weight in calculating a
reasonable royalty rate.’” (quoting Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d
512, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1995))); Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 519 (holding that reasonable
royalty could not exceed rate used in comparable license); Cequent Trailer Prods.,
Inc. v. Intradin (Shanghai) Mach. Co., No. 1:05-CV-2566, 2007 WL 438140, at *8
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2007) (“[P]rior and existing licenses for patented technology are
the ‘most influential factor’ in determining a reasonable royalty.” (quoting Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 1333, 1353 (D. Del. 1994))); cf.
Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (setting
aside damage award based on expert’s damages model that did not take estab-
lished licensing practices into account).
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made the basis for future litigation royalties, they perpetuate
the excessive damage awards.  The inflated premium extracted
from one firm drives a litigation outcome for the next firm.
Knowing this, patent holders have an incentive to negotiate
first with parties least able to litigate or otherwise resist and
thus most likely to agree to inflated royalties, and then to use
those agreements as benchmarks in later litigation and negoti-
ations.  The feedback loop is complete.256
IV
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE
A. Economic Concepts
1. Key Incentives
The patent system has a variety of effects, which create a
variety of incentives.257  We focus here on two that are key to
determining efficient remedies.
Most important, patent protection is intended to encourage
invention and dissemination of new ideas.258  Generally, to the
extent patents increase the profits an inventor can realize from
an invention, the more incentive the inventor will have to in-
vent.  Generous remedies (such as high damages and easy-to-
obtain injunctions) increase this incentive; limited remedies
reduce it.259  Excessively generous remedies can induce parties
to obtain patents as litigation tools beyond their economic
value to technology users and consumers.260
A second countervailing incentive is for others to develop
new products and to make further innovations building upon
256 Lemley and Shapiro noted many years ago that courts’ “reliance on private
license deals involves a degree of circularity,” but they did not explore the feed-
back loop implications of that circularity.  Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at R
2021.
257 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (explain-
ing that the goals of the patent system are to “foster and reward invention,” to
promote “disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation . . .[,] to permit
the public to practice the invention once the patent expires,” and to “assure that
ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public”); Roger D.
Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1,
45 nn.214–15 (2001) (listing numerous different patent-related incentives that
courts have considered).
258 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (“[P]atent law seeks to foster and reward
invention.”).
259 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 4 (“Undercompensation can un- R
dermine the patent system’s incentives to innovate.  This could impair investment
in R&D and result in fewer new, innovative products and services.”).
260 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2176 (“The ability of patent hold- R
ers to extract excessive damages awards . . . adds to the incentives for bottom
feeding and litigation abuse.”).
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earlier inventions.261  Before developing and introducing a new
product, a firm must consider the potential costs that could
arise from future litigation involving the product, such as hav-
ing to pay damages for patent infringement and the risk of
being shut down by an injunction and losing its investment.262
Generous remedies reduce the incentives of others to innovate
and develop new products; limited remedies increase it.263
Where there is a willing licensee and a willing licensor, the
optimum patent royalty—to balance the incentive to invent and
the incentive to develop—rewards the patent holder with the
actual market value of the invention, but no more.  If the roy-
alty is less than that, the patentee will have too little incentive
to invent.  If the royalty is more than that, it will excessively
inhibit product development and follow-on innovation.264
The patent infringement remedy that reflects the inven-
tion’s market value is one that most closely restores the parties
to their ex ante positions—that is, the position the parties
would have been in if they had negotiated a license ex ante.265
261 See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (finding that one of the purposes of the
federal patent system is to “promote[ ] disclosure of inventions to stimulate further
innovation”).
262 See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 4, at 313–14 (“[S]upracompensatory awards R
could have the negative consequence of deterring potential offenders from engag-
ing in marginally lawful or efficient conduct.”).
263 A substantial body of research suggests that patents do not motivate in-
vention very much, if at all, in some important industries. See, e.g., Andrew W.
Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 130, 133 n.13 (2009) (citing studies that directly measure techno-
logical innovation in a single economy of interest).  To the extent these studies are
correct, patents would seem to be socially undesirable because they would deter
product development and follow-on invention with little or no offsetting benefit in
terms of inducing invention.  For purposes of this Article, however, we assume
that patents do provide an important incentive for invention and address the
question of optimal patent remedies given that assumption.
264 Excessive awards to patent holders will also induce parties to obtain pat-
ents—not to protect their inventions, but simply as a source of revenue.  If we are
correct that patent remedies are excessive, that might explain in part the expo-
nentially increasing number of patent applications in recent years. See Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–19
(2005).  Note that this is not to say all effects of excessive awards would be
negative—at least some new and useful inventions would likely result from
greater incentives for obtaining patents—but that the marginal result would be a
net loss because the benefits that might be derived from such inventions would
likely be less than the overall social cost necessary to incentivize them.
265 Some commentators have advocated basing the remedy on the value of the
patented technology without regard to any ex ante negotiation. See, e.g., Jarosz &
Chapman, supra note 9, at 811–12 (arguing that the hypothetical negotiation R
construct should be replaced with an asset valuation approach to calculating
reasonable royalty damages); Taylor, supra note 114, at 126–32 (advocating for R
the elimination of the hypothetical negotiation construct in order to emphasize
the valuation of patented technology rather than the valuation of patent rights).
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This is the remedy the leading cases contemplate, as discussed
above.266  Providing this remedy in an individual case requires
determining the market value of the patented invention absent
infringement and exclusive of factors such as lock-in costs and
litigation risks that are separate from the incremental benefit
conferred by the patent itself.267
2. Dimensions
The circumstances of patent infringement are more com-
plex than the simple reference to ex ante value suggests.  For
our purposes, we envision a matrix that distinguishes the vari-
ous circumstances along two dimensions: one reflecting the
nature of the infringer, the other reflecting the nature of the
patent holder.
a. Innocent vs. Guilty Infringement
Unlike the paradigmatic story, we recognize that infringers
are often “innocent” in the sense that that they acted correctly
by not preclearing all potentially relevant patent rights, and
that such behavior should be encouraged, not punished.
Infringers are not always innocent in this sense.  Specifi-
cally, we call an infringer guilty if it could cost-effectively have
avoided infringement by negotiating a license ex ante but chose
instead to infringe.  This occurs most often in industries that
are not characterized by rapid innovation or those, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, in which products or processes entail
technologies claimed by a small number of patents.268  This is
also more likely to be the case with respect to patents held by
competitors because firms are often better able to identify pat-
These approaches should lead to a similar result because, as explained above, the
incremental value of the patented technology is the maximum amount the tech-
nology user would have agreed to pay in an ex ante negotiation.  But these ap-
proaches would overstate the royalty in at least some cases because, by setting
the royalty at that maximum, they would allocate to the patent holder the entire
surplus or gain from the licensing transaction.  Depending on the bargaining
power of the parties, the surplus would in some cases be allocated differently, and
the actual market value of the patented technology would be less (and may not be
the same in all cases, because the value conferred—and thus the parties’ relative
bargaining power—may differ depending on product type, intended use, suitabil-
ity of alternatives for that use, and other factors that may inform the incremental
benefit conferred to a particular technology user).
266 See supra section I.A.2.
267 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 138 (“For remedies to protect the R
patent system’s incentives to innovate and avoid distorting competition among
technologies, they must replicate the reward the patentee would have earned in
the market absent infringement.”).
268 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. R
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ents held by other market participants (and indeed, there may
be competitive factors that incentivize firms to do so separate
from any concerns about potential patent infringement).269
Conversely, we call an infringer innocent if it could not
cost-effectively have negotiated a license ex ante.  This occurs
most often in industries characterized by “patent thickets” and
rapid innovation and thus the “develop without full
preclearance dynamic,”270 although it can also occur if, for
example, the infringed patent was not published before the
infringer became locked in to the infringing technology. It is
also more likely to occur in cases where the patent is held by an
NPE rather than a market participant.271  Because the in-
fringer is in the best position to know the difficulties it would
have faced trying to obtain preclearance ex ante, the infringer
should bear the burden of persuasion on this issue.
In theory, infringement can be guilty even in “develop with-
out full preclearance” industries if, for example, the infringer
actually knew that its product would infringe a particular pat-
ent or willfully blinded itself to the likelihood of that infringe-
ment by “tak[ing] deliberate actions to avoid learning of that
fact.”272  However, even an infringer that has actual knowledge
of the infringed patent ex ante might be innocent for one of two
separate reasons.  First, because patents are often ambiguous
in scope, it is often difficult to determine whether a proposed
product would infringe and whether the patent is likely
valid.273  Second, the sheer multiplicity of patents might make
it inefficiently costly for an infringer to negotiate licenses ex
ante for even the subset of patents that it believes are likely
valid and infringed.274
269 See supra subpart II.A.
270 See infra section IV.B.1.
271 See supra subpart II.B.
272 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011)
(discussing willful blindness in the context of liability for inducing infringement).
273 See supra subpart II.B.  Whether it is cost-effective to negotiate ex ante
may depend in part on the uncertainty about validity and infringement and the
strength of the potential claims.  A reasonable infringer would be less likely to
negotiate a license ex ante if the infringement claim is weak.
274 There is a further scenario in which an infringer that had ex ante knowl-
edge of the infringed patent might be deemed innocent—if the infringing product
has a large number of complementary inputs, whether patented or not, that are
designed to work with the patented technology and there is thus is no realistic
noninfringing way to make the product or a close substitute.  In that situation, the
risk that the infringer would be deemed to be a guilty infringer would enable even
a patent holder that wanted to license the patent to use the threat of an injunction
to extract a royalty that reflects the value of other inputs as well as the patented
technology.  The likelihood of such hold-up might be easier to demonstrate if the
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There are, however, two closely related scenarios in which
infringement should be regarded as guilty even where it would
be unrealistic to expect “full preclearance.”  Both cases involve
infringement of a patent held by a competitor.  In the first case,
the technology user infringes the patent knowing (or willfully
blinded itself from knowing) that the competitor is at least gen-
erally unwilling to license the patent for the infringer’s intended
use.  In the second case, the infringer copies a product that is
sold by a competitor and knows (or willfully blinded itself from
knowing) that the competitor’s product depends upon technol-
ogies covered by patents owned or exclusively licensed by the
competitor.275  In these situations, the infringer should not be
able to use its inability to obtain full preclearance as an excuse
for not trying to obtain a license from the competitor, who
might prefer to prohibit or restrict the use of its patented tech-
nologies in competition against it.
It is also possible for an innocent infringer to become at a
later time a guilty infringer with respect to later-developed
products that bear no relation to the prior infringing products.
As discussed above, once a firm becomes locked in to particu-
lar technology, it will often be prohibitively expensive to switch
to an alternative.276  This lock-in will generally persist through
subsequent generations of products to the extent that those
later generations rely on the same underlying technology, in-
frastructure, customer knowledge, supply chain, third-party
compatibility, backwards compatibility, and so on.  Thus, any
infringement with respect to these products will continue to be
innocent.  But in some circumstances an innocent infringer
might not be locked in to, and might be able to cost-effectively
negotiate a license with respect to a new, unrelated product
that uses the patented technology.  That is most likely to be the
case if there is no path dependence with respect to the develop-
ment, production, sale, or use of the later product.  In that
situation, the infringer might become a guilty infringer with
respect to the new product.277
infringer had attempted to negotiate a license in advance, but it should not be
required to do so as a matter of law.
275 Global-Tech was such a case.  The infringer copied a competitor’s product
and then intentionally concealed the copying when it sought a noninfringement
opinion from an attorney. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2060, 2070.
276 See supra subpart II.C.
277 Current law embraces a similar approach in the context of res judicata and
similar preclusion doctrines.  For example, the Kessler doctrine prevents a patent
holder from alleging infringement against products that are “essentially the same”
as different products that acquired “noninfringing” status as a result of prior
litigation.  See, e.g., Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1055–58 (Fed.
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Determining whether an infringer is innocent or guilty will
often be easy.  Infringers of SEPs used in standard-compliant
products, for example, will almost always be innocent.278  In
other cases, such as those described in the preceding para-
graph, it might be difficult for courts to make the determina-
tion.  But efforts by the infringer to manipulate the facts to
make it more likely that it will be found to be innocent should
be constrained to some extent by the fact that the infringer will
have the burden of proof on this issue.  Moreover, this is hardly
the only difficult factual issue that courts are called upon to
resolve in infringement cases, and this issue is similar to those
that courts are currently called upon to resolve in deciding
whether infringement was willful.279
Cir. 2014).  Likewise, the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion may
require a similar result. See id. at 1053–55.
278 In most cases, SSOs permit any member to declare that one or more of its
patents is essential to the standard without making a determination as to whether
any particular patent is actually essential.  As a result, knowledge by a standard
implementer that a patent has been declared essential to a standard is insuffi-
cient to constitute knowledge that the implementer is infringing a valid patent.  An
implementer is likely to be innocent, in any event, if there is a large number of SEP
holders and preclearance with all of them would be inefficient.
The European Union Court of Justice (ECJ) recently suggested a framework
for identifying the rare circumstances under which it might find an implementer
of a public standard to have engaged in something akin to guilty infringement and
thus to merit being enjoined from infringing a FRAND-committed patent. See
Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R.  The key to the
ECJ’s approach is whether the technology user had adequate notice of the alleged
infringement and engaged in bad faith conduct in negotiating a FRAND license.
Significantly, the ECJ emphasized that the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent
must first, before seeking an injunction, provide the alleged infringer with its
particular infringement claims with respect to each allegedly infringed patent as
well as its proposed FRAND royalty. Id. at ¶¶ 60–64.  When those circumstances
are met, the ECJ held that it may be appropriate for the patent holder to seek an
injunction against an infringer that refuses to respond to a FRAND offer or other-
wise engages in bad faith delaying tactics. Id. at ¶ 65.  The ECJ did not address
the impact of lock-in costs or the “develop without full preclearance” dynamic.
It might be appropriate to provide some manner of sanction for properly
defined bad faith conduct that follows innocent initial infringement.  As explained
below, however, an injunction will rarely be appropriate, particularly given that
the patent holder’s FRAND commitment is an acknowledgement that it is a willing
licensor and that a FRAND royalty constitutes adequate compensation for any use
of its patents. Cf. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2014), abrogated in part, Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (explaining that an injunction will rarely be appropriate with respect to
a FRAND-encumbered patent because “[a] patentee subject to FRAND commit-
ments may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm,” but noting that it may
be justified in cases where an infringer actually or constructively refuses to pay a
FRAND royalty).  An injunction would often be appropriate if a party refused to
pay a court-ordered royalty, but in such a case it would be in aid of the court’s
authority and not itself a remedy for infringement.
279 See supra subpart I.C.
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b. Ex Ante Willing vs. Unwilling Licensor
We call a patent holder an ex ante “unwilling licensor” if it
had a policy of not licensing the patent to the infringer (and
perhaps others) for the infringing use as of the lock-in date.
Unwilling licensors are generally those who would have
wanted, ex ante, to prevent the infringer (and perhaps others
like the infringer) from using the patented invention, at least for
that use.  They include patent holders who wanted to practice
the patents exclusively and those who wanted to license a lim-
ited number of others to exploit the patent for them.  We call a
patent holder an ex ante “willing licensor” if it would have in-
tended ex ante to license the patent for the infringing use to the
infringer or to some general category of technology users that
includes the infringer.280  It might have intended to do so be-
cause it wanted to monetize its patents or to use them to obtain
a cross-license or some other valuable asset.281  The category of
willing licensor also includes those who were legally required to
license their patents because, for example, they were bound by
a FRAND commitment made to an SSO.282
The patent holder should have the burden of persuasion on
this issue.  Because the issue turns on whether the patent
holder sought to prevent others from using the patented tech-
nology ex ante, problems of proof are unlikely to be insupera-
ble—particularly as courts already consider similar concerns
in the context of assessing the appropriateness of an injunction
under eBay.283
B. Efficient Remedies
These two dimensions can be combined in the following
table:
280 One is a “willing licensor” if it intended ex ante to license the patent even if
it would not have entered into a license ex ante.  In other words, a patent holder
cannot avoid being deemed a willing licensor for purposes of our analysis if it
intended all along to license the infringer but wanted to wait until the infringer
was locked-in in order to negotiate at that time a higher royalty.  Conversely, a
patent holder is a “willing licensor” only if it is willing to license the patent at a
price that is equal to or less than the maximum amount the licensee (or a rational
licensee) would have been willing to pay.  A patent holder should thus not neces-
sarily be deemed a “willing licensor” just because there is some price at which it
would have been willing to license the patent.
281 See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 391 (2002) (“[A]
firm will exploit its patents, even if the firm itself is not using them, by licensing
them to other firms.”).
282 See supra subpart III.C.
283 See supra section I.B.1.
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TABLE 2
Willing Licensor Unwilling Licensor
Innocent Infringer Category I Category II
Guilty Infringer Category III Category IV
In section 1, we discuss remedies when the infringer is
innocent (top row).  In section 2, we discuss remedies when the
infringer is guilty (bottom row).  In both instances, we consider
the case in which the patent holder is willing to license the
patent ex ante (left column) and the case in which the patent
holder is unwilling to do so (right column).
1. Innocent Infringement
Where the “develop without full preclearance” dynamic
prevails and it is not cost-effective for firms to negotiate a pat-
ent license ex ante, remedies law should not attempt to make
them do so or punish them if they do not.  That would be
socially wasteful.  In these circumstances, the “paradigmatic
story” is simply inapplicable.
a. Category I: Innocent Infringement with a Willing
Licensor
We begin by addressing Category I: the case in which the
infringer is innocent and the patent holder would have been
willing to license the patent ex ante.  Most NPE patent holders
are in this category.  Licensing is their business, so they are
generally willing and eager to grant licenses.284  Others who
might willingly license their patents to all comers include some
solo inventors and universities, which cannot develop the pat-
ented invention themselves, and firms with patents in markets
in which they do not themselves compete, patents covering
technologies that are likely to account for a small part of the
value of the products that utilize them and for which an injunc-
tion is therefore unlikely, and patents whose principal value is
as barter for cross-licenses.  In many cases, these parties are
interested in injunctive relief only as leverage to obtain higher
license fees.
Economic Characteristics—In innocent infringement/will-
ing licensor cases, courts should strictly limit past damages to
the royalty the parties would have negotiated in a genuinely ex
284 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 9, at 2129 (explaining that NPEs are inter- R
ested only in monetizing their patents).
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ante hypothetical negotiation.  This royalty is the best estimate
of the true value of the patented invention and represents the
optimal tradeoff between inventors’ incentives to invent and
firms’ incentives to develop new products.285
As we have discussed, however, a vicious cycle of overcom-
pensation arises under current damages law in such cases.
The law allows consideration of ex post factors such as lock-in
costs to inflate litigation royalties; these inflated royalties com-
bine with the risk of injunctive relief to inflate the costs of
licenses negotiated in the shadow of litigation; and these in-
flated license fees, in turn, inflate litigation royalties and per-
petuate the cycle.286
Such overcompensation is socially costly.  It can severely
reduce firms’ incentives to innovate and develop new products.
Before introducing a new product, a firm must consider the
near certainty that there are multiple (unknown) patents that
read on the product, the high costs of patent litigation,287 and
the likely infringement remedies it will face.
Past Damages—Fortunately, the legal basis to break the
vicious cycle already exists.  As discussed in subpart III.C
above, courts have squarely confronted lock-in in the context of
standard-essential patents, and their adjustments have gone a
long way toward addressing the issue.  These adjustments
should extend to all cases with an innocent infringer and a
willing licensee.288
285 See supra section IV.A.1.  In an actual ex ante bargain, parties might agree
on a negotiated royalty that is discounted to account for the possibility that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.  In the hypothetical negotiation, by contrast,
which is assessed after validity and infringement have been adjudicated and the
patent holder has thus borne the risk of losing on those issues, royalties are
determined based on the assumption that the patent is valid and infringed and
thus should not include any such discount.
286 See supra subpart II.B.
287 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 56 & n.27 (citing “normal R
patent litigation costs” of $4 to $5 million per case).  Moreover, these costs in-
crease the more successful the projected product turns out to be.  Successful
products attract patent litigants and, as we have discussed, the “book of wisdom”
doctrine allows patent holders to retroactively capture part of the benefit if the
product proves unexpectedly successful.
288 The economic rationale for determining reasonable royalty damages by ex
ante market value is the same in both cases.  Absent some special and explicit
policy to the contrary, there is no reason as a general matter to think that SSOs
intend by requiring licensing on “reasonable” terms to require SEP holders to
license at rates that are lower than those otherwise properly deemed to be “rea-
sonable” for patent law purposes.  And there is no reason to think that the statu-
tory provision of “reasonable” royalty damages contemplates royalties that would
be unreasonable if charged by an SEP holder. See Jorge L. Contreras & Richard
J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 28–30) (on file with the Berkeley
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This extension is a natural one.  In economic terms, the
parties are in much the same circumstances in the innocent
infringer/willing licensor case as in the standard-essential pat-
ent case.  In both cases, the infringer faces significant lock-in
costs ex post, and the patent holder is known or deemed to be
willing to grant a license ex ante (before the lock-in costs came
into play).
Three specific reforms from the standard-essential case
law would aid in breaking the vicious cycle if extended to all
innocent infringer/willing licensee cases.  First, the hypotheti-
cal negotiation date should be set just prior to the time that the
infringer became committed to using the infringing technology,
which in most cases will be the lock-in date.  In other words,
the hypothetical “ex ante” negotiation should be assumed to
have taken place on that date.  As we discussed in section
III.A.3 above, design and development cycles may be extensive
and may be complicated by numerous external factors, such
that a firm may be locked in to a technology before it sells or
even designs a product that implements it.  Courts acknowl-
edge this in standard-essential patent cases;289 they should do
the same in all cases involving innocent infringers and willing
licensees.
In the SSO context, courts properly use the earlier date on
which the SSO included the patented technology in the stan-
dard.290  For this, the courts rely primarily on economic and
policy considerations, namely that setting the hypothetical ne-
gotiation date at just before the patent was declared essential
to the standard results in a valuation that reflects the actual
benefit offered by the patent and excludes the hold-up value
and network effects created by its inclusion in the standard.291
Technology Law Journal) (advocating a common approach applicable to both
standard-essential and non-standard-essential patents, in which the incremental
value of the patent is evaluated prior to investments that are specific to the
patented technology).
289 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. R
290 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. R
291 There is a superficial parallel between the SSO case and the situation in
which multiple firms collaborate to create a proprietary standard, such as the
Blu-Ray standard. See generally AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS OF BLU-RAY DISC
ASSOCIATION, http://www.blu-raydisc.com/Assets/Downloadablefile/
BDA%20Bylaws%20V2.3.pdf [http://perma.cc/FD2P-F2NR] (describing the Blu-
Ray Disc Association and its aim to broaden the acceptance of Blu-Ray Disc
formats).  The creation of such a proprietary standard will often increase the
amount a technology user would be willing to pay for a license to a patent that is
essential to the standard, because the standard would facilitate the commercial
exploitation of the patented technology.  Arguably, therefore, the technology user
should be deemed to be locked-in when the proprietary standard is created, and
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Courts also sometimes appear to embrace a contract-like view
(i.e., that the FRAND commitment is made as of that date),
which reflects those economic and policy considerations and in
effect embodies the patent holder’s commitment to accept the
royalty to which it would have agreed on that date if there had
been an ex ante bargain.292
Second, information from after the hypothetical negotia-
tion date—including under the “book of wisdom” doctrine—
should be carefully scrutinized and admitted only to the extent
it is probative of what the parties would have done at the time
of the hypothetical negotiation.293  Indeed, the jury should be
the hypothetical negotiation should be deemed to have taken place on that date.
We think the better course, however, would be to determine the lock-in date on
the basis of actions taken by the infringer, and not third parties, in all cases other
than those involving industry-wide standard-setting organizations.  Allowing
broader consideration of the implications of actions by third parties would create
insuperable line-drawing problems and would complicate litigation.  Perhaps
more important, industry-wide SSOs have enormous economic clout; they pur-
port to represent both technology users and patent holders; and for those reasons
they are expected to protect technology users from hold-up by patent holders.
The creators of proprietary standards, by contrast, rarely have market power for a
new, untested standard and are generally entitled to reap the fruits of their crea-
tion through, among other things, the prices they charge to others who want to
implement their proprietary standard. See Standard Setting and Market Power:
Hearing on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-
Based Economy Before the FTC & DOJ 10 (2002) (statement of Richard T. Rapp,
President, Nat. Econ. Research Assoc. & Lauren J. Stiroh, Vice President, Nat.
Econ. Research Assoc.); Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History of RAND, 20 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 211, 244 (2014).  The ability of firms that have preexisting power in
the relevant market to collaborate on a proprietary standard may be constrained
by antitrust law. See Alan Devlin, Standard Setting and the Failure of Price Com-
petition, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 217, 227–32 (2009).
292 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (Posner, J., sitting by designation).  For a critique of the contract, property,
and antitrust law bases that courts have employed to explain and enforce various
aspects of FRAND commitments, see generally Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reli-
ance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV.
479 (proposing a “market reliance” justification for permitting third parties to
enforce a patent holder’s FRAND commitments).
293 See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1229–31 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (rejecting poststandardization patent valuation in standard-essential pat-
ent context); see also Gooding, supra note 137, at 1–2 (explaining that courts R
should use ex post information only for the limited purpose of ascertaining how
parties to a hypothetical negotiation would have valued a patent ex ante, and
demonstrating that commercial practices of market valuation in other areas simi-
larly limit the use of ex post information).  Further, as with standard-essential
patents, the royalty should not increase just because the product is surprisingly
successful.  The infringer bore the risk of failure by investing in the new product
and should be permitted to reap the fruits of success.
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instructed on lock-in and told to disregard any value arising
from it.294
Third, relatedly, the Georgia-Pacific factors should be modi-
fied in innocent infringer/willing licensor cases.  The Federal
Circuit has never mandated the use of these factors295 and has
expressly required omitting some and modifying others in a
standard-essential patent case.296  Its skepticism about those
factors should also apply to all innocent infringer/willing licen-
sor cases.  In such cases, too, “many of the Georgia-Pacific fac-
tors simply are not relevant.”297
Some Georgia-Pacific factors should be omitted entirely in
Category I cases, in particular Factor 8 (“[t]he established prof-
itability of the product made under the patent; its commercial
success; and its current popularity”) and Factor 11 (“[t]he ex-
tent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and
any evidence probative of the value of that use”).298  These are
directed solely at ex post considerations.
Other Georgia-Pacific factors should be used only if and to
the extent they shed light on what the parties would have
known and used in ex ante negotiations.  Factor 10 (“[t]he na-
ture of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and
the benefits to those who have used the invention”299) should
include only “the nature of the patented invention” and the
“commercial embodiment” that the parties would have antici-
pated ex ante (except to the extent the patent holder can prove
that an ex ante license would not have permitted such an em-
294 The Federal Circuit approved this for standard-essential patents in Erics-
son, 773 F.3d at 1233 (“Because SEP holders should only be compensated for the
added benefit of their inventions, the jury must be told to differentiate the added
benefit from any value the innovation gains because it has become standard
essential.”).
295 WhitServe, LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 31–32 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
296 See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1229–31.
297 Id. at 1230; see also Durie & Lemley, supra note 111, at 636 (arguing that R
the relevant Georgia-Pacific factors fall into “four basic categories: (1) whether the
patentee in fact produces a product in the market; (2) the contribution made by
the patented technology compared to the next best alternative; (3) the number
and importance of other inputs necessary to make that technology work; and (4)
evidence of how the market has actually valued the patent, to the extent it differs
from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3)”).
298 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).  The Federal Circuit specifically rejected Factor 8 for standard-
essential cases, finding the “invention’s ‘current popularity’ . . . is likely inflated
because a standard requires the use of the technology.” Ericsson, 773 F.3d at
1231.  The same is true when lock-in arises from other causes.
299 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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bodiment by the licensee).  The other aspects of Factor 10 re-
late solely to the infringer’s ex post usage, and introduce a
significant degree of ex post contamination.300  Factor 13 (“[t]he
portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features
or improvements added by the infringer”301) is useful insofar as
it instructs the jury to apportion the value of the product on
which the royalty is based between its patented and unpat-
ented components.  But it mistakenly focuses on the infringer’s
actual (ex post) profit, rather than its expected (ex ante) profit.
It should be modified to focus on the latter.  Finally, Factor 6302
should also focus on what the parties expected ex ante rather
than on ex post outcomes.
If ex post contamination were reduced in this way, the
vicious cycle might well turn virtuous: lower litigation royalties
would lead to lower license fees, which in turn would lead to
still lower royalties.  One would expect the system to converge
to an equilibrium in which actual royalties, expected royalties,
and license fees all approximate the ex ante value of the pat-
ented invention.
Prospective Remedies—No injunction should issue in the
innocent infringer/willing licensor case.303  The patent holder
was seeking (or is deemed to have been seeking) royalties
rather than exclusivity ex ante.  Had it succeeded, it would not
later have had the option of an injunction.  Giving it an injunc-
tion ex post would serve only to enable the patent holder to
extract a premium from the infringer based in part on the lat-
ter’s lock-in costs.304  That would overcompensate the patent
holder and reduce other firms’ incentives to develop new prod-
ucts.305  It would also harm consumers and other users of the
300 See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1231 (stating that parts of Factor 10 are inappli-
cable in standard-essential cases).
301 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
302 Id. (“The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or
convoyed sales.”).
303 An injunction might be appropriate if the infringer refuses to pay a court-
ordered judgment, but an injunction in that case would be a remedy for not
complying with the court order, not a remedy for patent infringement.
304 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text; supra section III.D.2.
305 The principal argument for injunctive relief and enhanced damages reme-
dies is that they will facilitate efficient transactions between patent holders and
would-be technology users. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intel-
lectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition,
in COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY 416, 430 (Geoffrey A.
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infringer’s products, including those who might be innovating
on the basis of those products.
Current injunction law is generally consistent with this
proposal.  Under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,306 a truly
willing patent holder would rarely be able to establish that it is
entitled to an injunction because it would rarely be able to
establish either that it is irreparably harmed by the infringe-
ment or that money damages are an insufficient remedy.307
Since eBay, only 26% of patent cases in which NPEs have
prevailed resulted in an injunction (as compared with 79% of
cases in which practicing entities have prevailed).308
Current doctrine is more problematic with regard to for-
ward-looking monetary relief.  The law of ongoing royalties, for
example, systematically overcompensates the patent holder.
As we discussed in subpart I.B above, it not only contaminates
the royalty calculation with ex post evidence but also provides
for an indefensible validity and infringement premium over the
reasonable royalty rate.
The royalty rate established by an ex ante hypothetical
negotiation is equally appropriate after trial as before.309
Where both parties were willing to enter into an agreement ex
ante, it can be presumed that the agreed-upon license would
have extended beyond the date of the infringement trial, pre-
sumably for the full term of the patent.  Trial and the interven-
ing events changed nothing of any relevant economic
significance, and validity and infringement were assumed in
Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011) (noting that a central “problem with
liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for the patentee to attract
and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party while preserv-
ing the option to terminate the negotiations”).  This argument is inapplicable
where circumstances make full preclearance of patent rights infeasible.
306 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
307 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
308 Chien & Lemley, supra note 46, at 10 fig.1.  Further, in cases where the R
injunction an NPE sought was contested, the grant rate was only 7%. See id.
309 Arguably, even in the case of an innocent infringer, the royalty might be
enhanced if the technology user does not negotiate in good faith after a patent
holder plausibly claims that it is infringing a valid patent. See supra note 278 and R
accompanying text.  But “good faith” negotiations would depend on numerous
factors, including the technology user’s subjective view of the likelihood that the
asserted patent is valid and infringed, the royalties that the parties would have
agreed upon in an ex ante negotiation, and the conduct of the patent holder.  Well-
counseled firms should be able to avoid a finding of “bad faith,” and courts are
unlikely to be able to determine bad faith reliably.  Adding that issue to already
complex patent litigation would complicate matters even more and would be un-
likely to induce more efficient conduct.
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computing the royalty rate for past infringement.310  Thus, for-
ward-looking monetary relief should either be an ongoing roy-
alty at the same rate or else a lump sum equal to the net
present value of that royalty rate for the remainder of the pat-
ent’s term.311
b. Category II: Innocent Infringement with an Unwilling
Licensor
Category II involves the less common case where the patent
holder would not have been willing, ex ante, to license the
patent to the (innocent) infringer.
Economic Characteristics—In economic terms, this is a
more difficult case.  Assuming the patent holder is rational, its
unwillingness to license means that it would not have been
able to realize expected net gains from a deal allowing the in-
fringer to use the technology.  The infringer’s use of the pat-
ented technology was not efficient.  But it happened, the
infringer is innocent, and now the infringer is locked in.
Importantly, in this case, this suboptimal outcome is
neither side’s fault because neither could cost-effectively have
avoided it.  Rather, high search and transaction costs of avoid-
ing infringement are likely to blame, especially in fields that
have a “develop without full preclearance” dynamic.
It follows that, even though this outcome is unfortunate, it
would be counterproductive to use remedies law to try to en-
sure that it never occurs.  It cannot be cost-effectively avoided.
Remedies law should instead aim to address the situation ef-
fectively when it does occur, preserving incentives for inventors
and product developers who might find themselves in an inno-
cent infringement/unwilling patent holder situation in the
future.
Past Damages—Assuming the patent holder is rational,
lost profits may be available in innocent infringer/unwilling
licensor cases and would be an appropriate remedy.312  Where
lost profits are not available, an ex ante reasonable royalty is
optimal.
310 See supra notes 229–31 and accompanying text.  In the rare case in which
the patent holder can prove that it was willing to license for only a limited term
and intended ex ante not to license thereafter, it should be deemed to be an
unwilling licensor with respect to infringement after the expiration of that term.
311 See, e.g., Pers. Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 9:09CV111, 2011 WL
3269330, at *13 (E.D. Tex. July 29, 2011) (entering judgment on jury’s verdict
that represented lump sum verdict covered all past and present use of the pat-
ented technology).
312 See supra section I.A.1.
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A rational patent holder would be willing to forego the reve-
nue from licensing its patent only if it expects to gain even more
from keeping the potential infringer out of the market.  In other
words, an unwilling patent holder is one who expects the bene-
fits of exclusivity (at least against the potential licensee) to be
greater than the potential licensing royalty. Most legitimate
uses of patent exclusivity arise from sales of products that
compete with the infringer’s.313  The patent holder may benefit
from them directly, if it sells the competing products itself,314
or indirectly, if it licenses the patent to one or more entities who
sell the competing products and extracts a license premium for
keeping the infringer out of the market.
Lost profits are generally available to compensate patent
holders for losses that arise from competition by infringing
products.315  The doctrine is flexible enough to cover both di-
rect and indirect losses.  When the patent holder itself loses
sales to the infringer’s product, it can recover the profit it would
have made on those sales;316 and when its licensees lose sales,
it can recover the royalties it lost as a result.317  Licensees who
were promised exclusivity can also join the suit and recover
any additional profits they lost as a result of the
infringement.318
Lost profits strike the right balance in innocent infringer/
unwilling licensee cases, provided they are tied to the sales lost
as a result of the infringer’s use of the patented technology as
opposed to other factors.  They then reflect the value of the
patented invention to a patent holder who seeks market
exclusivity.319
313 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3, at 320–21 (noting that patents are R
often sought to prevent others from obtaining a patent that might be used to
prevent applicants from using their innovations).
314 The patent holder’s competing products need not themselves practice the
patent.  A patent holder might want to exclude others from making infringing
products that compete with its own established line of nonpatent practicing prod-
ucts. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548–49 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (holding that lost profits damages may be awarded with respect to
lost sales of nonpatent practicing products “if it is proven that those lost sales
were caused in fact by the infringement”).
315 See supra section I.A.1.
316 See supra section I.A.1.
317 Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546 (explaining that reasonably foreseeable lost sales
are compensable).
318 Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
319 Traditionally, apportionment has applied in lost profits calculations be-
cause patent damages awards were meant to compensate for the lost profits that
would have been attributable to the value of the invention.  However, since the
development of the “but for” test of lost profits, it is not clear that apportionment
remains applicable. See generally Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in
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It is true that the evidentiary burden of proving lost profits
is a heavy one.320  But patent holders that have made an af-
firmative, rational decision not to license will usually be able to
prove lost profits.  And patent holders who did not make such a
decision will be discouraged from later claiming that they did.
Lost profits are based on much the same considerations as
the rational decision not to license, although the two determi-
nations are made at different times.  Thus, for instance, when
determining whether to license its patent, a rational patent
holder would evaluate factors much like those specified in
Panduit: (1) whether it expected there to be demand for the
patented product; (2) whether the infringer could compete ef-
fectively by using an acceptable noninfringing substitute; (3)
whether the patent holder had the manufacturing and market-
ing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) how much profit it
expected to make.321
The difference in when the determinations are made is not
significant.  It is true that the patent holder’s ex ante decision
not to license might be proved wrong—i.e., it might turn out
that the patent holder has no actual lost profits attributable to
the infringement—and that licensing would have been the
more profitable ex ante policy.  The patent holder suffers no
harm from its inability to show lost profits in such a case and
in fact might be better off than it would have been had there
been no infringement because a reasonable royalty is still avail-
able.322  If the royalty approximately equals the license fee that
would have been offered in an ex ante negotiation, it is no less
than the patent holder would have obtained if it had actually
negotiated.
The high burden of proving lost profits serves a useful
screening function.  To the extent that an ex ante unwilling
patent holder has access to remedies that a willing patent
Contemporary Patent Damages Cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13–23 (2005) (re-
viewing the historical development of apportionment in lost profits cases and
concluding that apportionment is still good law, but largely ignored in modern
patent cases).
320 See supra section I.A.1.  Mark Lemley has argued that courts should draw
a sharper distinction between lost profits and reasonable royalty damages and
that to make such a divide workable, courts should be “more lenient than they
have been in requiring proof of lost profits.” See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing
Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 671–72
(2009).
321 See supra section I.A.1 (discussing the Panduit factors); cf. Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
322 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (providing that damages can “in no event [be]
less than a reasonable royalty”).
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holder does not—higher damages, for example, or the possibil-
ity of an injunction—all patent holders have an incentive to
claim to have been unwilling.  In many cases, there will be no
established licensing policy with which to test the claim.323
But because the considerations involved in proving lost profits
also shed light on the likelihood that the patent holder would
have agreed to a license ex ante, they serve as a useful screen of
unfounded claims that the patent holder was an unwilling
licensor.
In the rare cases where the patent holder can establish
that it would not have licensed the patent ex ante, but not that
it suffered damages, it would be entitled to a reasonable roy-
alty.324  The calculation of the reasonable royalty damages
would be slightly different from that described above because,
if the patent holder was unwilling, there is no royalty on which
the parties would have agreed ex ante.  One solution would be
to deem the reasonable royalty to be the maximum amount
that a willing licensee would have agreed to pay ex ante, but
that solution would award the full value of the patented tech-
nology to the patent holder, even though the infringer was in-
nocent.  A better solution might therefore be to set the
reasonable royalty at an amount that lets the parties share the
surplus created by the patented technology.
Georgia-Pacific Factor 4 (“[t]he licensor’s established policy
and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by
not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monop-
oly”325) suggests a basis for increasing the damages to compen-
sate an unwilling licensee for the loss of market exclusivity.
Such an increment is appropriate if used sparingly, only in
cases where the patent holder has clearly established its ex
ante unwillingness to license and a likelihood that it was
harmed in some unquantifiable way by the infringement and in
excess of the reasonable royalty damages, and with sensitivity
to the innocence of the infringer.  The increased damages
should in no event be punitive or so high that the infringer
would have anticipated losing money ex ante if it had known of
the royalty rate at that time.
323 In most circumstances, it will be very difficult for a nonpracticing entity to
claim that it was an unwilling licensor, particularly if it lacks an established
licensing program under which it granted exclusive rights to a single party or
otherwise committed to limit its licensees.
324 Id.
325 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Prospective Remedies—Prospective remedies in the inno-
cent infringer/unwilling licensor context—especially injunctive
relief—pose a difficult problem.  On one hand, the patent owner
would have sought exclusivity, rather than a license fee, ex
ante, and denying an injunction amounts to imposing a com-
pulsory license.326  On the other hand, as we have discussed,
granting an injunction could subject the innocent defendant to
very large losses arising from lock-in.327  The prospect of such
losses would severely reduce firms’ incentives to develop prod-
ucts, even in a “develop without full preclearance” context.
Because both parties are innocent, the remedy should be
designed to create optimal incentives going forward, rather
than to punish past conduct or deter similar conduct in the
future.  We propose a remedy that draws upon a typology intro-
duced by one of us in an article with Guido Calabresi that
distinguishes between “property rules” and “liability rules.”328
As articulated there: “An entitlement is protected by a property
rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the enti-
tlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller.”329  And it is protected by a “liability rule”
when “someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is will-
ing to pay an objectively determined value for it.”330  Both the
patent holder and the infringer could have an entitlement pro-
tected by either a property rule or a liability rule.  There are
four possibilities:
Rule 1: Property-rule protection for the patent holder.  The
patent holder is entitled to an injunction to prevent the in-
fringer from using the patent, and the infringer could prac-
326 See Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1158 (setting the royalty rate equal to the rate the
parties would have negotiated ex ante “would . . . make an election to infringe a
handy means for competitors to impose a ‘compulsory license’ policy upon every
patent owner.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 173 (discussing concerns R
about imposing such “compulsory licenses”); Cotter, supra note 4, at 316 (“[A] R
reasonable royalty that really does reflect what the parties would have agreed to
ex ante might leave the defendant no worse off as a result of the infringement
(except for attorney’s fees—an important qualification—and any other uncompen-
sated costs) and, thus, inhibit the channeling function of patent damages.”).
327 See supra subpart II.C and section III.D.2.
328 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
Dan Burk has analyzed how this typology could apply to intellectual property
remedies. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property in the Cathedral, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT
FU¨R GEISTIGES EIGENTUM/INT. PROP. J. 405, 406–09 (2013) [hereinafter Burk, Intel-
lectual Property in the Cathedral]; Dan L. Burk, Means and Meaning in Patent
Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 13, 18–19 (2013).
329 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 328, at 1092. R
330 Id.
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tice the patent only if it convinces the patent holder to permit
it to do so.
Rule 2: Liability-rule protection for the patent holder.  The
patent holder cannot prevent an infringer from practicing its
patent, but it is entitled to reasonable royalty compensation
set by the court.
Rule 3: Property-rule protection for the infringer.  The infringer
has a right to infringe and need not compensate the patent
holder for doing so.  This rule applies, for instance, if the
patent is found invalid, unenforceable or not infringed.
Rule 4: Liability-rule protection for the infringer.  The patent
holder can prevent an infringer from practicing the patent (as
in Rule 1), but it must compensate the patent holder for the
costs its doing so imposes on the infringer, such as the in-
fringer’s cost of switching to a noninfringing alternative.331
In the case of an innocent infringer and an unwilling licen-
sor, we propose a combination of Rule 2 and Rule 4.  The pat-
ent holder should be offered an injunction, on the condition
that it pays all the infringer’s costs to switch to a noninfringing
alternative (Rule 4).332  If the patent holder chooses not to take
the injunction on these terms, it would still get a reasonable
ongoing royalty at the same rate as for past damages (Rule 2);
such royalties may be appropriately based on lost profits in
cases where such losses are proven.333
331 See also Burk, Intellectual Property in the Cathedral, supra note 328, at 413 R
(noting that this list could be expanded to include Rule 5 and Rule 6 “put” options
allocated to either the infringer or the patent holder; in the first case, the infringer
would be permitted to continue infringing but could elect to stop infringing at a
later date and receive damages, and in the second case, the patent holder would
be awarded an injunction but could elect to waive the injunction at a later date
and receive damages).
332 In some circumstances, it might be appropriate to grant an injunction but
stay the injunction for a limited period of time to permit design-around.  A stay
has the advantage of minimizing disruption and thus might be an efficient solu-
tion in circumstances where the infringer can design-around promptly but an
injunction is otherwise appropriate.  But the prospect of staying an injunction
does not make the injunction remedy appropriate where it would not otherwise be
because a stay does not solve the hold-up problem when, as is usually the case,
design-around costs exceed the ex ante value of the patent. See Lemley & Me-
lamed, supra note 9, at 2175 n.232 (discussing the possibility of staying injunc- R
tive relief to permit design-around, explaining that “[w]hether this will work
depends on the ease of finding an alternative (which is properly related to the
value of the patent) and the ease of switching to that alternative after the fact
(which is not).  Where implementing an alternative is difficult or very costly, even
temporarily staying the injunction will not avoid the leverage the injunction or
threat thereof gives to the patent holder to negotiate a royalty in excess of the ex
ante value of the patent”); see also Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2037–38 R
(proposing guidelines for injunction delay).
333 Both Rule 2 and Rule 4 are liability rules.  Mark Lemley and Phil Weiser
have argued that liability rules are appropriate for patents, but for the different
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This combination would have the patent holder internalize
both the benefits and the costs of an injunction and would give
it an incentive to make the socially efficient choice.334  If the
infringer’s costs to switch are less than the value to the patent
holder of market exclusivity, the patent holder will choose the
injunction; if the reverse is true, it will choose the royalty.335
One can imagine the alternative of giving the infringer the
choice between Rule 2 and Rule 4.  But, in contrast to our
proposed remedy, the infringer would not necessarily have an
incentive to make the most efficient choice.  The infringer might
choose Rule 4, even if the costs to switch are greater than the
royalty and the patent holder’s lost profits, because that alter-
native would be costless to it; the infringer would then both
avoid paying future royalties and be able to switch at the patent
holder’s expense.
The proposed remedy would preserve technology users’ in-
centive to develop new products.  They will know that they will
not lose their entire investment through innocent infringement.
And the proposed remedy would largely preserve inventors’ in-
centives to innovate and disseminate their inventions.  They
will know they can get exclusivity going forward if doing so is
efficient and that they are guaranteed at least a reasonable
royalty.  Moreover, since the royalty may include a “kicker”
based on Georgia-Pacific Factor 4 (the patent holder’s policy of
licensing or not licensing the patent),336 patent holders are
reason that it is commonly too difficult to fashion injunctions that exclude only
the infringing technology and not other product components as well.  Mark A.
Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property Rules or Liability Rules Govern Informa-
tion?, 85 TEX. L. REV 783, 784–85 (2007).
334 This is one of those situations in which liability rules are more effective
than property rules in dealing with the problem of undisclosed private valuation
information and are thus more likely to lead to an efficient outcome. See generally
Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1038–39 (1995) (explaining that an
entitlement holder in a liability regime may reveal how it values the entitlement by
seeking to “(1) ‘bribe’ a potential taker not to take the entitlement; or (2) ‘sell’ its
entitlement at a price less than the liability rule damage amount”).
335 It might be thought that, because both parties are innocent, they should
split the switching costs.  But the patent holder internalizes all the benefits of an
injunction.  If it would internalize only half the switching costs, it would have an
incentive to choose the injunction even if the total costs of the injunction exceeded
its benefits.  Indeed, a patent holder would take the injunction even if it was worth
less than half the switching costs because it would then ordinarily have the option
of selling to the infringer relief from the injunction (thus enabling the infringer to
switch and relieving the patent holder of any obligation to pay any switching
costs).
336 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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generally compensated at least to some extent for their loss of
market exclusivity.337
Courts have the ability to implement such a remedy under
existing law, stemming from their authority to place conditions
on injunctions in the interest of equity, including, in appropri-
ate cases, the authority to condition an injunction on the plain-
tiff making a payment to the defendant.338
2. Guilty Infringement
We now turn to cases of guilty infringement—instances in
which the infringer could have cost-effectively learned of and
negotiated for a license to the infringed patent, but did not do
so.  This occurs most frequently in disputes between
competitors.
Guilty infringement, unlike the innocent infringement we
have discussed so far, implicates an additional incentive,
namely, the incentive to negotiate ex ante.  Where ex ante nego-
tiation between the parties is practical, it is better than ex post
resolution of infringement by the courts for a variety of reasons.
First, the costs of negotiating ex ante are usually much lower
than the costs of litigating infringement.339  Second, ex ante
negotiation substantially increases the likelihood that the par-
ties will make economically efficient choices—that is, either the
parties will agree to a license or the potential infringer will
choose an alternative rather than accept a license at the patent
holder’s lowest offer.340  Third, it is more efficient for the parties
337 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554–55, 1554 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding that the district court’s reasonable royalty
determination was justified in part by the fact that “that Rite–Hite had consist-
ently followed a policy of exploiting its own patents, rather than licensing to
competitors”).
338 See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708
(Ariz. 1972) (granting an injunction to real estate developer against a cattle feed-
ing operation that had become a nuisance, but requiring the real estate developer
to indemnify the cattle feeding operation for a reasonable amount of the cost of
moving or shutting down); Pac. Hills Homeowners Ass’n v. Prun, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d
653, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, in enjoining homeowners to move or shorten fence and gate to comply
with homeowners’ association’s height and setback restriction, by requiring asso-
ciation to pay two-thirds of the cost of moving fence).
339 See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text (discussing the high cost R
of patent litigation).
340 Blair & Cotter, supra note 257, at 59 (“Presumably, the patent owner would R
have agreed [ex ante] to a royalty equal to no less than the profit she could have
expected to earn from manufacturing the invention herself; the infringer would
have agreed to a royalty equal to no more than the amount he could have expected
to earn from using a non-infringing alternative.”).
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to negotiate a price ex ante than for a court to attempt to
determine, ex post, the price that they would have reached.341
Remedies in the guilty infringement case, therefore, should
also be designed to encourage firms that can cost-effectively
negotiate ex ante to do so instead of infringing.  This in turn
means that guilty infringers should pay a penalty beyond the
ex ante value of the patented invention for infringing without
first negotiating.342  A firm would have no incentive to negotiate
for a license ex ante, instead of infringing, if it were confident
that the penalty for infringement was no more than the price it
would pay for a license.  Such an infringer might rationally
choose not to negotiate ex ante because the patent holder
might never discover the infringement and might not sue if it
did.
a. Category III: Guilty Infringement with a Willing
Licensor
Economic Characteristics—As discussed above, to promote
ex ante negotiations in this scenario, a guilty infringer should
be required to pay more than an innocent infringer—i.e., more
than a reasonable royalty—whether or not the patent holder
would have been willing to license the patent ex ante.
Past Damages—The base level of compensation should be
a reasonable royalty that reflects either the patent holder’s lost
profits or, if the patent holder cannot prove lost profits, the ex
ante value of the patented invention.  To encourage ex ante
negotiation in these circumstances, however, the patent holder
should receive enhanced damages.  The maximum amount of
enhancement needed for deterrence is that which, combined
with the compensatory damages, would equal the infringer’s
past and expected future benefit from the infringement (relative
to the next-best alternative), increased to take into account the
ex ante likelihood that the infringer would have avoided paying
341 See id. at 48 (“[It is advantageous to] encourage would-be users of the
patented invention to negotiate with the patent owner, the theory being that the
outcome of these private negotiations is likely to result in a license fee that more
accurately reflects the value of the invention than would a compulsory-licensing
fee set by the government.”).
342 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Yale,
forthcoming 2015) (ch. 6) (on file with authors) (arguing that tort and other com-
pensatory remedies might be increased to take into account public interests be-
yond those of the parties to the legal dispute); Guido Calabresi, A Broader View of
the Cathedral: The Significance of the Liability Rule, Correcting a Misapprehension,
77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6–7 (2014) (arguing the same).
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appropriate compensation for its use of the infringing
technology.343
Existing willfulness law permits enhanced royalties for
some guilty infringers, but not all, because it focuses on the
infringer’s knowledge of or intent to infringe the patent-in-suit.
The inquiry contemplated here, by contrast, would focus on the
reasonableness of the infringer’s failure to negotiate a license
ex ante in light of his or her assessment of the strength of the
infringement claim, the number of patents and patent holders
implicated by his or her product, and the cost of negotiating a
license ex ante.
Guilty infringement should be evaluated only as of the hy-
pothetical negotiation date (and not—as with willfulness—at
any time after infringement has begun).  That is the time at
which the willing licensor would have agreed to a royalty, and
the infringer will have incurred lock-in costs after that date.344
Firms should be neither required to negotiate for a license after
they are already locked in nor penalized for not doing so.  That
would force them to pay a lock-in premium that would reduce
firms’ incentive to develop new products.345
Prospective Relief—Although a closer question than when
the infringer is innocent, on balance no injunction should issue
in these cases.  The guilty infringer should be penalized only by
enhanced damages for past infringement.
First, while one would expect a guilty infringer and a will-
ing licensor to bargain around the injunction, there is always
the possibility that negotiations will fail for some reason.  If
they do—meaning that the injunction goes into effect—the re-
sult is a net loss for society as a whole.  Removing the infringing
product from the market will usually impose costs on innocent
third parties, such as the infringer’s suppliers and customers,
which have reasonably relied on the availability of the prod-
uct.346  In addition, any money or effort the infringer spends to
switch to a new product is a social loss that creates little or no
countervailing benefit.
343 See generally, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
344 See supra subpart II.C.
345 See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1088 (2003) (proposing that willfulness
should be evaluated as of the date the infringer adopted the infringing technology
rather than on an ongoing basis).
346 See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (E.D.
Tex. 2006) (denying a permanent injunction in part because of its potential nega-
tive effect on consumers who used defendant’s product).
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Second, if the parties do manage to contract around the
injunction, it adds little value.  The patent holder gets an unex-
pected windfall: the lock-in premium it can extract.  But this
premium, being unpredictable and dependent on misconduct
by the infringer, adds little to other inventors’ incentive to in-
vent or patent.
Third, enhanced damages are a more flexible way to incen-
tivize guilty infringers to negotiate ex ante.  Injunctions are
binary: either the infringing product is enjoined (subject to po-
tential design-around) or it is not.  There is a limit to how
closely injunctions can be tailored to the nature and extent of
the infringer’s guilt.  Enhanced damages, by contrast, can be
set to a level that reflects the particular circumstances.347
Current injunction law would probably reach the same re-
sult.  Although the guilt of the infringer might tilt the balance of
the equities factor in favor of the patent holder, a patent holder
that is a willing licensee is not irreparably harmed by being
denied an injunction, and money damages are sufficient to
compensate it.348
That leaves the question of the appropriate forward-looking
monetary relief in guilty infringer/willing licensor cases.  For-
ward-looking damages should be used only to compensate the
patent holder.  The compensatory purpose is accomplished by
an ongoing royalty calculated the same way as the compensa-
tory (i.e., without enhancement) royalty for past damages (or
the equivalent lump sum royalty), just as in the innocent in-
fringement case.349
Unlike past damages, forward-looking damages should not
be used to penalize the infringer for not having negotiated ex
ante.  Any such penalty can be included in enhanced damages
for past infringement.  Enhancing royalties for ongoing in-
fringement is thus not necessary for deterrent purposes and
would inefficiently increase the marginal cost of, and thus re-
duce, both the commercialization of the patented technology
and follow-on innovation.350
347 See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 4, at 327 (discussing various factors that R
might affect enhanced damages, albeit not within the existing willfulness law).
348 See z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (denying nonpracticing entity’s
request for permanent injunction against willful infringer); supra section I.B.1.
349 See supra subsection IV.B.1.a.
350 See Erik Hovenkamp, On the Law and Economics of Ongoing Patent Reme-
dies (on file with  authors).
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b. Category IV: Guilty Infringement with an Unwilling
Licensor
Economic Characteristics—The final category, where the in-
fringer is guilty and the patent holder would not have been
willing to license ex ante, calls for the severest remedies.  This
case often arises between two competitors.  The patent holder’s
unwillingness to license means that the infringer’s use of the
patented technology was not efficient and should never have
begun.351  But this time, the suboptimal outcome is the in-
fringer’s fault; it could have cost-effectively avoided the out-
come by negotiating up front, thereby learning that no deal
could be reached.
Remedies in these cases should be enhanced beyond the
reasonable royalty rate for two reasons: to penalize the in-
fringer for not negotiating ex ante (and thus incentivize future
infringers to do so) and to compensate the patent holder for the
loss of market exclusivity caused by the infringer.
Past Damages—The compensatory aspect of past damages
is similar to Category II cases (innocent infringer/unwilling li-
censor).  As there, lost profits will usually be available; and if
not, the patent holder should get a reasonable royalty.  In this
case, unlike Category II, because the infringer is guilty, the
royalty should be equal to the maximum amount to which a
willing licensee would have agreed ex ante.  As in Category II,
that amount may, in appropriate cases, include a moderate
“kicker” pursuant to Georgia-Pacific Factor 4 to compensate the
patent holder for its loss of market exclusivity.352
In addition, damages should be enhanced to punish the
guilty infringer.  The adjusted version of willfulness described
above with respect to Category III (guilty infringer/willing licen-
sor) is equally applicable in this case.
Prospective Remedies—An injunction should usually be
appropriate, unless the public interest requires otherwise.353
Unlike cases where the infringement was innocent, the in-
fringer here should not have deprived the patent holder of the
market exclusivity it sought.  Therefore, it is appropriate to
have the infringer bear the costs that arise from restoring that
exclusivity—namely, the cost of switching to a different
technology.
351 See supra subsection IV.B.1.b.
352 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
353 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. R
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It is possible, of course, that circumstances will have
changed since the ex ante period and actually excluding the
infringer is no longer the best outcome for the patent holder.
The patent holder might nevertheless seek an injunction in
order to extract even higher royalties from the infringer.  An
injunction should not be available in that case.  The excessive
royalty would impose a tax on customers of the infringer that
could harm the public and needlessly distort competition be-
tween the infringer and its competitors.  And precluding bar-
gaining chip injunctions ensures that the patent holder will
seek an injunction only if excluding the infringer is efficient.354
For forward-looking monetary relief in the instances in
which an injunction is not appropriate, the same analysis as in
Category III (guilty infringer/willing licensor) applies.355  The
compensatory purpose of such relief can be accomplished by
an ongoing royalty or the equivalent lump sum royalty; as with
Category II, such royalties may be appropriately based on lost
profits in cases where such losses are proven.
CONCLUSION
Current patent infringement remedies do not adequately
further the key incentives of the patent system: patentees’ in-
centive to invent, firms’ incentive to innovate and develop new
products, and the incentive for patent holders and firms to
negotiate patent licenses ex ante.  The law is implicitly based
on a “paradigmatic story” of patent infringement in which ex
ante license negotiations are assumed to be economically feasi-
ble.  That story is not generally applicable, particularly in “de-
velop without full preclearance” fields like IT where a profusion
of overlapping and unclear patent rights makes full patent
preclearance so costly that in most cases it is neither economi-
cally feasible nor socially desirable.
Current doctrine permits ex post considerations to con-
taminate the hypothetical ex ante negotiation on which dam-
ages are supposed to be based.  The resulting reasonable
royalty damages are based in part on the infringers’ investment
354 A requirement that the injunction may not be used as a bargaining chip to
obtain higher royalties could be enforced in a variety of ways.  For example, the
court might invite the infringer to move to vacate the injunction if the patent
holder or a successor endeavors to license the patent to it, or might prohibit the
patent holder from licensing the patent to the infringer for the term of the
injunction.
355 See supra subsection IV.B.2.a.
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in the infringing technology (i.e., its lock-in costs) rather than
just on the value of the invention itself.
The result is a vicious cycle that perpetuates excessive roy-
alty rates: lock-in premiums inflate damages awards; these
awards, together with the threat of an injunction or exclusion
order, increase royalties in ex post licenses negotiated in the
shadow of litigation; and these increased royalties, in turn,
drive future damages awards because negotiated license rates
are a key factor in computing a reasonable royalty.
We have proposed a number of ways to break this vicious
cycle.  Damages law should be sensitive to two key factors.  The
first factor is whether the infringer is “guilty” or “innocent”—
i.e., whether it could have cost effectively discovered the pat-
ent, identified the infringement, and negotiated for a license ex
ante.  The law should not try to make innocent infringers nego-
tiate for patent licenses ex ante or punish them if they do not
do so; such negotiation is not cost effective and requiring it
would unduly reduce firms’ incentives to innovate and develop
new products and processes.
By contrast, guilty infringers, who can effectively negotiate
ex ante, should be incentivized to do so and should be penal-
ized if they do not.  Damages awards in cases involving them
should exceed the invention’s ex ante value in most cases.
The second key factor is the infringer’s ex ante willingness
or unwillingness to license the patent.  An ex ante willing licen-
sor is adequately compensated by the strictly ex ante reasona-
ble royalty that would have resulted from ex ante negotiations.
However, an ex ante unwilling licensor might not be adequately
compensated by such a royalty.  Unwilling licensors should
recover lost profits where they can be proven, and they will
sometimes receive enhanced damages awarded to punish and
thus deter guilty infringement.  Unwilling licensors generally
should also be entitled to an injunction to prevent future in-
fringement.  In cases of innocent infringement, however, the
patent holder should be required either to pay the infringer’s
cost to switch to a noninfringing alternative or to forego the
injunction and receive an ongoing royalty at the same rate as
past damages.
